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Article 
Making Patents Useful 
Sean B. Seymore†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
It is axiomatic in patent law that an invention must be 
useful.1 A requirement for utility appeared in the original Pa-
tent Act of 17902
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 and has remained a part of the statutory 
 1. See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL IN-
VENTIONS § 338 (1890) (“[N]o patent can be granted for a worthless art or in-
strument, nor, although granted, can it be sustained after the uselessness of 
the invention is established.”); cf. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) 
(identifying utility as a part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain). The re-
quirement for utility applies to utility patents (also known as patents for in-
vention), which cover any new or improved “process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Utility patents are the most 
common type of patent and the focus of this Article. The U.S. patent system 
grants two other types of patents: design patents, which protect any “new, 
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture,” id. § 171 (2006), 
amended by Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-211, §§ 202(a)(1), 203(a)(1), 126 Stat. 1527, 1536; and plant patents, which 
protect any “distinct and new variety of plant.” Id. § 161 (2006). 
 2. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (repealed 1793) 
(“[U]pon the petition of any person or persons . . . that he, she, or they, hath or 
have invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or 
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used . . . it shall and 
may be lawful . . . to cause letters patent to be made out . . . .” (emphasis add-
ed)). 
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scheme.3 It is codified in § 101 of the current patent statute, 
which states in relevant part that “[w]hoever invents or discov-
ers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter . . . may obtain a patent.”4 Utility is regarded 
as an essential condition for patentability.5
But what does it mean to be useful? The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines the term simply as “beneficial”
 
6 or “fit[] for 
some desirable purpose or valuable end.”7 The abstract and im-
precise nature of the term invites subjective interpretations be-
cause virtually everything can be used by someone for some-
thing.8
But does utility have a similar de minimis meaning in pa-
tent law? Congress has never defined “useful” in the patent 
statute, or even specified from whose perspective utility is to be 
determined.
 So it seems that a thing has utility as long as it can 
provide some benefit. 
9 Perhaps this is why, throughout most of the histo-
ry of U.S. patent law, utility was given short shrift. This de 
minimis interpretation is often attributed to Justice Story, who 
in the 1817 case Bedford v. Hunt defined a useful invention as 
“one as may be applied to some beneficial use in society, in con-
tradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to the morals, 
the health, or the good order of society.”10
 
 3. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21 (repealed 
1836) (granting patent eligibility to a person who has “invented any new and 
useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement”); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (re-
pealed 1870) (identical language); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 
198, 201 (repealed 1952) (same). 
 Until the middle of 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 5. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1966) (identifying the 
three explicit conditions for patentability as novelty, utility, and 
nonobviousness); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“[Utility is] a fundamental requirement of American patent law, dating 
back some two-hundred years . . . .”). 
 6. 19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 356 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “useful”).  
 7. Id. at 368 (defining “utility”). 
 8. Even a failed experiment has utility because it eliminates whatever 
approach was under consideration, makes way for an alternative, and always 
produces data from which others can learn. See, e.g., NEIL BALDWIN, EDISON 
51 (1995) (quoting Thomas Edison’s remarks to financial supporters that “[n]o 
experiments are useless”). 
 9. This is not uncommon in patent law. See John F. Duffy, The Federal 
Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 544 
(2010) (explaining that patent law “has traditionally had a common law feel to 
it” because the courts receive little guidance from statutory sources). 
 10. 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217) 
(emphasis added). 
  
1048 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1046 
 
the twentieth century, utility was easily satisfied as long as the 
invention could operate to achieve its intended result.11
A low utility threshold aligns with the broad policy goals of 
the patent system. The Supreme Court recognized as much in 
1966 in Brenner v. Manson, where Justice Fortas acknowledged 
that a de minimis standard “encourage[s] inventors of new 
[products and] processes to publicize the event for the benefit of 
the entire scientific community, thus widening the search for 
uses and increasing the fund of scientific knowledge.”
 
12 Stated 
more succinctly, a de minimis standard promotes knowledge 
dissemination and the disclosure function of the patent system. 
Nevertheless, the Manson Court abandoned the de minimis 
standard in favor of one which substantially ratcheted up utili-
ty’s gatekeeping role in patent law.13
So why did this happen? Manson, a chemical case, arose 
toward the end of a transformative period in patent law when 
the invention landscape changed from primarily mechanical 
devices to one populated with chemical and pharmaceutical in-
ventions.
  
14 Determining how to adapt the utility requirement to 
accommodate this new landscape led to conflicts among judges 
on the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.),15 
tension between the C.C.P.A. and the Patent Office,16 and sharp 
ideological disagreements among Supreme Court Justices.17
Though the moral and public welfare requirements were 
ultimately jettisoned,
 
18 the modern utility requirement set forth 
in Manson and its progeny is even more subjective than the one 
it replaced. Not only must the disclosed utility be credible,19
 
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 it 
 12. 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966). 
 13. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 14. See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL 
MED. 263, 263–69 (1990). 
 15. The C.C.P.A. was a five-judge Article III court on the same level as the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals. See U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Suc-
cessor to the Court of Customs Appeals), 1910–1982, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_cpa.html (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2013). It was abolished by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the Federal Circuit adopted the 
C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 
690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 16. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 17. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 19. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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must also allow a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA)20 to use the invention to provide a significant, im-
mediate, and well-defined benefit to the public.21
This is why utility’s invigorated role in patent law has 
come at a price. It has transformed § 101 into a powerful gate-
keeper that allows the Patent Office and courts to subjectively 
decide when or if something can be patented.
  
22 One conse-
quence has been the development of a bias against patentabil-
ity for certain types of inventions. History reveals that those 
seeking patents on inventions in nascent technologies, fields 
which have a poor track record of success, and unpredictable 
fields like chemistry, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals have 
had to fight with the Patent Office and in the courts over utili-
ty.23 On the other hand, applicants who seek patents on toys 
and games have no problems establishing utility.24
Utility has received very little attention in the academic 
literature—perhaps because it is assumed to be a “low bar” to 
patentability
 No court or 
commentator has been able to convincingly explain the logic 
behind the differing utility thresholds.  
25 or a “nonexistent” patentability requirement.26
 
 20. The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the 
reasonably prudent person in torts. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 
810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that a PHOSITA “is not un-
like the ‘reasonable man’ and other ghosts in the law”). Factors relevant to 
constructing the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the sophisti-
cation of the technology, the educational level of the inventor, the educational 
level of active workers in the field, the types of problems encountered in the 
art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the rapidity with which innova-
tions are made. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (listing the factors). 
 
 21. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (construing “use-
ful” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 to require “substantial” and “specific” utility); In re 
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining the terms); see also infra 
Part I.C.2. 
 22. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda 
for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2087 (2000) (“Another possible 
way of understanding the utility requirement is as a timing device, helping to 
identify when an invention is ripe for patent protection.”). 
 23. See Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 
1494, 1507 (2011) [hereinafter Seymore, Patently Impossible].  
 24. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) 
(“Nor does the Patent Office worry about the utility of games, toys, and cos-
metics.”). 
 25. Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based Open Sci-
ence, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 356 n.90 (2007) (“The utility requirement is still 
properly understood as very low and generally presents a low bar to patenta-
bility.”); see Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MA-
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As this Article will show, such statements are inaccurate. It is 
more correct to say that the utility threshold is decidedly bi-
ased—a de minimis threshold for some inventions but a consid-
erably more stringent one for others. One reason why patent 
denials based on a lack of utility are relatively rare might be 
because potential applicants with inventions falling into one of 
the disfavored categories logically decide not to waste time and 
money pursuing a patent if a denial is inevitable. Such behav-
ior clearly hinders innovation and compromises fundamental 
goals of the patent system.27
Some have argued that the utility requirement furthers 
the constitutional mandate to promote technological progress 
by helping to ensure that the public receives a benefit from the 
patent grant.
  
28 This Article takes a radically different position. 
Aside from arguing that utility is not mandated by the Consti-
tution,29 this Article argues that it is a superfluous requirement 
because the ends it seeks can be accomplished through compli-
ance with (or more rigorous enforcement of) other patentability 
requirements.30
For all of these reasons, this Article calls for the elimina-
tion of a stand-alone utility requirement. This is the first Arti-
cle to both harshly criticize utility and—by seeking to eliminate 
it—urge a radical rethinking of what should be included in (or 
removed from) the patentability calculus.
  
31
 
SON L. REV. 57, 58 (2011) (noting that inventions which fail to meet the cur-
rent standard are rare). 
 Its goal is to inform 
 26. Risch, supra note 25, at 58. 
 27. See infra Part III.A. 
 28. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 29. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 30. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 31. Though several commentators have criticized utility—particularly as 
applied to chemical and pharmaceutical inventions—they assume that it must 
be retained for constitutional or statutory reasons. See, e.g., Eric P. Mirabel, 
“Practical Utility” Is a Useless Concept, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 811 (1987); Law-
rence R. Velvel, A Critique of Brenner v. Manson, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5 
(1967); Brent Nelson Rushforth, Comment, The Patentability of Chemical In-
termediates, 56 CAL. L. REV. 497, 497–98 (1968). On the other hand, a few 
commentators have argued that utility should play a greater gatekeeping role 
in patent law. See Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 
1195, 1240–41 (advocating a “commercial utility” requirement, which would be 
present if there were “sufficient evidence to convince a [PHOSITA] that a) 
there is a market for the invention, and that b) the invention can be manufac-
tured at a cost sufficient to fulfill market demand”); Risch, supra note 25, at 
74–100; Teresa M. Summers, Note, The Scope of Utility in the Twenty-First 
Century: New Guidance for Gene-Related Patents, 91 GEO. L.J. 475, 508–09 
(2003) (advocating a heightened utility test). 
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the ongoing debate over patent reform and spark further dis-
cussions about the extent to which basic patent doctrines actu-
ally promote technological progress. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how utility 
began as a trivial patentability requirement but transformed 
into one which is decidedly biased—de minimis for some inven-
tions but considerably more stringent for others. After briefly 
explaining how utility is currently assessed, Part II shows how 
the current rubric ignores an invention’s inherent usefulness 
and often devolves into a subjective judgment about when or if 
something should be patentable. Such an arbitrary standard, 
this Part argues, frustrates fundamental goals of the patent 
system. To that end, Part III proposes the elimination of utility 
as a condition for patentability. 
I.  WHY IMPOSE A UTILITY REQUIREMENT?   
A. TO HELP ENSURE THAT THE INVENTION BENEFITS THE 
PUBLIC 
Until the twentieth century, patent denials for a lack of 
utility were rare. During this period the Patent Office and the 
courts agreed with Justice Story that the threshold should be 
low.32 Recall that his test had two prongs: first, that the inven-
tion provided “some beneficial use” to the public;33 and second, 
that the asserted utility was not “injurious to the morals, the 
health, or the good order of society.”34 The latter—a negative 
requirement—can be traced to the English Statute of Monopo-
lies of 1623.35 Justice Story’s second prong created a forbidden 
class of inventions36
 
 32. See Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Mass. 1817) (No. 1217); supra text accompanying note 
 that included things like “a new invention 
10 (discussing Bedford). 
 33. Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.  
 34. Id. 
 35. It provided that patents could be granted and enforced so long as the 
invention “was not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state . . . or 
generally inconvenient.” Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6. For 
an example of the latter, Lord Edward Coke explained that even a machine 
which could do the work of many humans was unpatentable because “it was 
holden inconvenient to turn so many laboring men to idleness.” EDWARD 
COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 184 (4th 
ed. 1669). 
 36. Mirabel, supra note 31, at 813. 
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to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate pri-
vate assassination.”37
The Supreme Court added a third prong in 1873 in Mitch-
ell v. Tilghman.
  
38 Citing the legal historian George Ticknor 
Curtis’s famous treatise on patent law,39 the Court held that 
utility is lacking “where it appears that [the invention] is not 
capable of being used to effect the object proposed.”40 This has 
come to be known as the “operability” prong of the utility re-
quirement. In theory, it, too, is de minimis because an inven-
tion is inoperable only if it is “totally incapable of achieving a 
useful result.”41
In summary, by the late nineteenth century, some benefi-
cial use was sufficient to establish utility unless the invention 
was inoperable or detrimental to the public interest.
  
42 The 
standard was truly de minimis, as noted in an 1883 treatise 
The Patentability of Inventions, which stated that “[a]s to the 
term ‘useful’, the courts have construed the condition expressed 
by it so liberally that it almost never serves to defeat a pa-
tent.”43
B. TO SERVE AS A GATEKEEPER 
 
1. The Emergence of a Double Standard 
a. An Evolving Invention Landscape  
The abstract and imprecise nature of the term “useful,” 
combined with the absence of legislative guidance, has made 
utility the most malleable patentability requirement. Mallea-
 
 37. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
 38. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287 (1873). 
 39. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
USEFUL INVENTIONS, AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA (4th ed. 1873). 
 40. Mitchell, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 396 (citing CURTIS, supra note 39, 
§ 494). 
 41. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1992); cf. In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“It is fun-
damental in patent law that an alleged invention . . . must appear capable of 
doing the things claimed . . . .”). An applicant satisfies the operability prong as 
long as the invention accomplishes at least one stated objective. Raytheon Co. 
v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 42. See CURTIS, supra note 39, § 494. 
 43. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 179 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (quoting HENRY C. 
MERWIN, THE PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS 75 (1883)), overruled by In re 
Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).  
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bility is not a foreign concept to patent law—indeed, it is ex-
pected. As the nature of the invention landscape changes to re-
flect advances in science and technology, patent law must re-
spond.44 It does so through the evolution of the common law.45
Of course, some changes to the invention landscape are 
easier to handle than others. For example, the evolution of air-
craft propeller blades over the past century from wood to metal 
to polymer composites has been easy to accommodate because 
the underlying technology is easily understood.
  
46 In patent law, 
propeller blades and other mechanical devices are deemed 
“predictable” because they are rooted in well-defined factors 
such as mechanical or electrical elements.47 By contrast, chemi-
cals, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology are referred to as 
“unpredictable” because a PHOSITA often cannot predict out-
comes or extrapolate results with a reasonable expectation of 
success.48
b. Targeted Inventions 
 
The malleability of the utility requirement has allowed the 
courts to create technologically specific standards for certain 
classes of inventions to achieve particular policy goals. The 
most notable classes so targeted have been chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
 44. This makes sense because “any law[s] purporting to provide a regula-
tory foundation for innovation must be able to account for both the broad 
range of technologies and the rapid pace of [technological] change.” R. Polk 
Wagner, Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341, 1344 (2003). 
 45. This is true even though all inventions—irrespective of technological 
field—must satisfy the same statutory patentability criteria. Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1575−77 
(2003); see also Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Pa-
tents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010) (noting that the common law is “the domi-
nant legal force in the development of U.S. patent law”). 
 46. See generally Mike Burden et al., Advanced Polymer Composite Pro-
peller Blades, in AEROSPACE MATERIALS 59, 60–62 (Brian Cantor et al. eds., 
2001); Alvin Edward Moore, The Screw Propeller, 23 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 896, 
899–928 (1941).  
 47. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing In re Fisher, 
427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 48. Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 136–54 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, Heightened Ena-
blement]. For example, in the chemical arts, “a slight variation [in a structure 
or method] can yield an unpredictable result or not work at all.” Cedarapids, 
Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 
1997).  
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Before World War II, chemical compounds were subject to 
the same de minimis utility standard as other inventions.49 
This changed, however, shortly after the war. By this time the 
invention landscape had transformed from mechanical devices 
to predominately chemicals and pharmaceuticals50—from pre-
dictable to unpredictable.51 The Patent Office responded by 
making a unilateral policy decision to ratchet up the applicable 
utility standard.52
At least for chemicals and pharmaceuticals claiming ther-
apeutic activity, the courts agreed. They specifically targeted 
inventions purporting to effectively treat diseases or conditions, 
like cancer and baldness, which the lay public long considered 
to be untreatable or incurable.
 
53
 
 49. See, e.g., Potter v. Tone, 36 App. D.C. 181, 184–85 (D.C. Cir. 1911) (re-
jecting the contention that the claimed compound must have a commercial use 
and holding that the description of its characteristics and properties had value 
for educational and research purposes and were sufficient to establish utility), 
discussed in David A. Anderson & Edward E. Dyson, Note, Some Special Prob-
lems with the Utility Requirement in Chemical Patents, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
809, 810 (1967) (“The court felt that to require a showing of use in some com-
mercial process . . . would amount to a holding that the inventor must make 
another invention which could be the subject of another patent.”); Ex parte 
Watt, 63 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 163, 165 (Bd. Pat. App. 1942) (determining that a 
chemical compound whose sole use was that of a chemical intermediate met 
the utility requirement).  
 But it is doubtful that patent 
examiners and judges during that period could competently 
evaluate what was scientifically possible because they were not 
 50. See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7–11 (1983) (describing the “therapeutic revolu-
tion”). 
 51. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 52. In 1956, the Commissioner of Patents squarely rejected the Patent Of-
fice’s pre-war liberal view of utility in chemical cases: 
[I]n the past very little attention was paid to the requirement for a 
disclosure of utility in chemical cases. Some chemical patents were is-
sued with specifications reciting the barest suggestions of uses for the 
new compounds claimed, or even without uses being stated at all. It 
was generally the position of the Patent Office that a chemical com-
pound could be regarded as an intermediate substance useful in the 
preparation of other compounds, since it was regarded as obvious that 
any organic compound could be so used.  
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 952–53 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Robert C. Watson, Comm’r, U.S. Patent Office, Remarks to the Division of 
Medicinal Chemistry of the American Chemical Society (Sept. 19, 1956)).  
 53. See Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra note 23, at 1514–22 (discuss-
ing the judiciary’s reluctance to grant patents on inventions purporting to ef-
fectively treat baldness and cancer). 
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active researchers and therefore were divorced from what was 
happening at the forefront of technology.54
The courts soon adopted a heightened utility standard not 
only for therapeutic claims, but for any claim that purported to 
achieve a result that seemed impossible. The Patent Office and 
the courts justified their skepticism as necessary for the sake of 
the public good.
  
55 As the argument goes, there was a belief (al-
beit an incorrect one) among the public and potential inves-
tors56 that the government never issues patents on inoperable 
inventions.57 Good public policy required the strict policing of 
seemingly impossible inventions to protect the public from po-
tentially harmful products that do not work as claimed, and to 
protect potential investors from unscrupulous patentees.58
 
 54. Id. at 1512–13. 
 
 55. As stated by the Board: 
  The Office is particularly bound to take notice of the question of 
utility, because . . . a [patent] grant is an assurance to the public of 
the conclusions of the Office . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Cases are not unknown where patents have been secured . . . and 
then used simply to impose on a public not disposed to scrutinize 
closely the merits of a matter upon which the Patent Office has set 
the seal of its approval. 
Ex parte Moore, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 8, 9 (Bd. Pat. App. 1960) (quoting Ex 
parte De Bausset, 43 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1583, 1585 (1888)), cited with ap-
proval in In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 253 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
 56. It is axiomatic in patent law that many inventors must rely on inves-
tors to cover the hefty costs of patent procurement and commercialization. See 
JOHN SAMSON, INVENTIONS AND THEIR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (1896) 
(“To have the use of capital is nearly always indispensable for the development 
of an invention, and, unless the inventor is of that fortunate class who have 
the means to work their own patents, he must appeal for support to one or 
more people with money.”). 
 57. Daniel C. Rislove, Comment, A Case Study of Inoperable Inventions: 
Why Is the USPTO Patenting Pseudoscience?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1280. 
 58. In re Citron, 325 F.2d at 253; see also Isenstead v. Watson, 157 F. 
Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 1957) (contending that the patent grant “gives a kind of of-
ficial imprimatur to the [invention] in question on which as a moral matter 
some members of the public are likely to rely”). The fear is that some might 
view the patent grant, albeit improperly, as the government’s endorsement of 
the technology. See Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues 
Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 253 n.29 
(2000) (noting that issuing patents covering controversial technologies might 
be viewed as governmental endorsement); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expres-
sive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 599–600 (2006) [hereinafter 
Holbrook, Expressive Impact] (explaining that governments may choose to de-
ny patents on certain inventions in order to eliminate the signal of perceived 
endorsement or encouragement). A patentee might also “advertise its patent to 
convince gullible consumers that a patent represents the government’s en-
dorsement or imprimatur that the advertised product is actually effective.” 
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What emerged was a bias against patentability for targeted in-
ventions. 
The preferred tool for screening out therapeutics and other 
incredible inventions was (in)operability—the third prong of 
the aforementioned utility test.59 Recall that an invention is in-
operable if it cannot achieve its intended result.60 The best ex-
ample of the bias in action was the reluctance of the Patent Of-
fice and the courts to grant patents for inventions claiming to 
effectively treat cancer. To be sure, for most of the twentieth 
century they were highly skeptical of any invention which pur-
ported to do so.61 Applicants claiming success faced an often in-
surmountable patentability hurdle because the courts allowed 
the Patent Office to impose a very high burden on the applicant 
to prove operability.62
The landmark opinion from this era is In re Citron, a 1963 
C.C.P.A. case in which an applicant alleged that a serum con-
taining hormone-like compounds extracted from cancerous tis-
sue could inhibit the inception and growth of certain types of 
cancer and effectively treat the disease.
 
63 The applicant’s dis-
closure described how to make the serum, provided analytical 
data, and contained a working example purporting to show its 
effectiveness in rats and humans.64
 
Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 144 (2008) (foot-
note omitted). But see In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 263 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“[T]he 
issuance of a patent is not in fact an ‘imprimatur’ as to . . . safety and effec-
tiveness . . . . [A patent] is no guarantee of anything . . . . The public, therefore, 
is in no way protected either by the granting or withholding of a patent.”). 
 Nevertheless, the examiner 
 59. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 60. See supra note 41 and cases cited therein. 
 61. See, e.g., Ex parte Moore, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 8, 9–10 (Bd. Pat. App. 
1960) (determining that any suggestion that the claimed compounds could 
treat cancer was incredible and misleading). One exception occurred in 1959 
when the Patent Office allowed a single medical use claim for a drug useful in 
bringing about remission in myeloid leukemia. See Ex parte Timmis, 123 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 581, 583 (Bd. Pat. App. 1959). But this occurred only after two 
prior appeals to the Board and overwhelming evidence, which included “volu-
minous” clinical evidence, prior FDA approval, endorsement by the American 
Medical Association, patient affidavits, peer-reviewed publications, and testi-
mony that “spontaneous remissions are rare in cases of leukemia.” Id. at 581–
83. 
 62. See, e.g., Timmis, 123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 581. This lies in contrast to 
the status quo, which places the burden on the Patent Office to prove inopera-
bility. See infra Part II.B. 
 63. 325 F.2d 248, 251 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (quoting from the written descrip-
tion of the invention in the application). 
 64. See id. at 251–52. Although the disclosure did not identify the hor-
mone-like compounds by name or structure, C.C.P.A. precedent permitted an 
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rejected the claim under § 101 and found that the applicant had 
not sustained his burden to prove operability.65 The Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences66 affirmed, explaining that 
the invention was “apparently inoperative” and, in light of con-
temporary knowledge in the art, could not “be accepted as op-
erative absent clear and convincing proof thereof.”67 This heavy 
burden imposed upon the applicant reveals the then-existing 
“double standard” for therapeutic inventions.68
2. Does Utility Have Limits? 
 
For a good number of therapeutic inventions, the issue was 
not credibility but whether the drug was safe for human use. 
Justice Story’s public interest prong (centered around the 
 
applicant to claim a product by the process of making it if there was no other 
way to define it. In re McKee, 95 F.2d 264, 266 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (sanctioning 
product-by-process claims). 
 65. Citron, 325 F.2d at 252. 
 66. An applicant whose claims have been twice rejected by the examiner 
can appeal to an intra-office tribunal—known as the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences at the time of Citron—which, among other things, reviews 
adverse decisions of examiners. 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), 134(a) (2006). The Board can 
affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the examining corps. 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.197 (2013). Since the passage of the America Invents Act in 2011, the tri-
bunal is now known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. See Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–93 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (eliminating interference proceed-
ings). 
 67. Citron, 325 F.2d at 252; cf. In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 
1969) (“Evidence submitted to establish usefulness must be such as would be 
clear and convincing to [a PHOSITA].”). Shifting the burden of proof to the ap-
plicant and ratcheting up the standard of proof were both in line with C.C.P.A. 
precedent. See, e.g., In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (“[I]f 
the alleged operation seems clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific 
principle . . . the presumption of inoperativeness is so strong that very clear 
evidence is required to overcome it.”); Irving Marcus, The Patent Office and 
Pharmaceutical Invention, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 669, 673 (1965) (explaining 
that, from the perspective of the examining corps, heightened proof is required 
if human use is involved and the condition is one which is difficult to treat). 
 68. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.04[2] (2013); see also In 
re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) (observing 
that while utility is rarely questioned for new machines, “[a]n elaborate ritual 
dance is required to satisfy the Patent Office as to the disclosure of [the] utility 
of a drug” (quoting Joseph Gray Jackson, Address at the Institute of Patent 
Law of the Southwest Legal Foundation (Mar. 30, 1967))). The double stand-
ard was in reaction to the common nineteenth-century practice to emphasize a 
product’s “patented” status, like the phrase “patent medicine,” to mislead the 
public. 4 CHISUM, supra, § 4.04[2][a] (quoting EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. 
PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 721 (1st ed. 
1972)). 
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“morals, the health, or the good order of society”)69 was the 
principal basis for denying patents under § 101 for safety-
related concerns. By the early 1960s, the Patent Office had 
promulgated a policy which required that applicants for thera-
peutic patents “supply proof of safety and effectiveness of the 
claimed composition in man,”70 notwithstanding any testing 
done on experimental animals.71
Realizing that the Patent Office had gone too far, the 
C.C.P.A. addressed the role of safety in the patentability calcu-
lus in the 1962 case In re Hartop.
  
72 The specific question for the 
court was whether clinical evidence or FDA approval should be 
a prerequisite for patenting drugs.73 Despite the Patent Office’s 
contention that it was “carrying out [its] statutory duty” by re-
quiring such proof,74
[W]e observe that any statutory authority given the Patent Office [to 
require such proof] would have to stem from the provision of 35 
U.S.C. § 101 that a patentable invention must be “useful.” A compari-
son of this provision with the detailed provisions of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act indi-
cates to us that if Congress had intended to use its constitutional au-
thority under the patent clause to do what it might not be able to do 
under the commerce clause, it would have enacted drug patent legis-
lation in detail corresponding to those two acts.
 the court concluded that no such duty 
arises from § 101: 
75
The C.C.P.A. and the Federal Circuit have reaffirmed that no 
provision in the patent statute establishes safety as a patenta-
bility criterion.
 
76 Imposing a safety component to § 101 should 
be left to Congress.77
 
 69. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 
1817) (No. 1217). 
 
 70. In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 263 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 71. Id. at 254. 
 72. 311 F.2d 249.  
 73. See id. at 251. 
 74. Id. at 260 (Smith, J., concurring) (quoting the Patent Office’s argu-
ment). 
 75. Id. at 259 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted); cf. In re Krimmel, 
292 F.2d 948, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (holding that as to whether the claimed 
drug was safe and effective for use in humans, “[i]t is not for us or the Patent 
Office to legislate and if the Congress desires to give this responsibility to the 
Patent Office, it should do so by statute”). 
 76. In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383, 1393–94 (C.C.P.A. 1969); accord Scott v. 
Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (Fed. Cir. 1994); cf. In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 
474–76 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (explaining that it is not the province of the Patent Of-
fice to determine, under § 101, whether drugs are safe).  
 77. See sources cited supra notes 75–76.  
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The moral utility doctrine has also been squarely rejected. 
It took a devastating blow in Ex parte Murphy, a 1977 case in 
which the Board reversed the examiner’s § 101 rejection of a 
slot machine.78 The final blow came nearly two decades later in 
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., where the Federal Cir-
cuit had to decide if an invention with a deceptive purpose—
designed to appear to be something that it is not—could satisfy 
the utility requirement.79
[S]ince Justice Story’s opinion[,] it has been stated that inventions 
that are “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of 
society” are unpatentable. . . . [But this principle] has not been ap-
plied broadly in recent years. . . .  
 The court answered in the affirma-
tive, noting that Justice Story’s forbidden class of inventions is 
not a part of modern utility doctrine: 
. . . . 
. . . As the Supreme Court put the point more generally, “Congress 
never intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers 
of the States, meaning by that term those powers by which the 
health, good order, peace and general welfare of the community are 
promoted.”80
Just as with safety, the court explained that imposing a moral 
component to § 101 should be left to Congress.
 
81
 
 78. 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 802 (B.P.A.I. 1977). 
 This demise of 
 79. 185 F.3d 1364, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 80. Id. at 1366–68 (citations omitted) (quoting Webber v. Virginia, 103 
U.S. 344, 347–48 (1880)). 
 81. Id. at 1368. The prospect for revival came a few years after Juicy 
Whip when the Patent Office received a patent application claiming a human-
animal hybrid. See U.S. Patent Application No. 10/308,135 (filed Dec. 3, 2002). 
The applicants had not made the hybrids; their purpose in filing the applica-
tion “was to provoke a debate and force Congress, the courts, or the USPTO to 
draw the line on patent-eligible subject matter.” Margo A. Bagley, Patent 
First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 469, 490 (2003). The examiner rejected the claim on several 
grounds, including a lack of utility based on the moral utility doctrine. See Of-
fice Action on Patent Application No. 10/308,135 at 21–24 (Mar. 5, 2003) [here-
inafter Office Action] (on file with author). Citing Justice Story’s opinion in 
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1817) 
(No. 8568), the examiner concluded that “[t]he discretion to consider the well-
being and good policy of society implicit in the statutory term ‘useful’ is 
properly applied when a refusal to grant a patent is necessary to avoid 
preempting the power of Congress to define essential questions of public poli-
cy.” Office Action, supra, at 23. In discussing the rejection and its broader im-
plications, Professor Timothy Holbrook argues: 
[T]he idea of denying the patent in order to allow Congress to consid-
er the issue first is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the [C]ourt allowed the patenting 
of a life form and noted that it is for the courts to decide patent eligi-
bility in the first instance. 
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the judicially created moral utility requirement is in complete 
accord with the Supreme Court’s “anything under the sun 
made by man” interpretation of patent-eligible subject matter 
set forth in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.82
C. TO ESTABLISH TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC PATENTABILITY 
STANDARDS 
 
One might have thought that the rejection of Justice Sto-
ry’s public interest prong signaled a decline in utility as a pa-
tentability lever. But that is not what happened. As discussed 
below, the Federal Circuit’s oft-quoted statement from Juicy 
Whip that “[t]he threshold for utility is not high”83
Recall that a key challenge for the post-World War II pa-
tent system is how to assess utility for chemical and pharma-
ceutical inventions.
 is true for 
some inventions but not for others. 
84
1. The Growing Tension 
 For those inventions with a known thera-
peutic activity at the time of patenting, the asserted utility was 
always clear—to treat some specific ailment or disease. But 
what about the much broader universe of chemical compounds 
which have no therapeutic or other concrete, non-research-
based use at the time patent protection is sought? The judicial 
response to this question—the essential utility question of the 
modern era—has shaped the current utility requirement. 
For the first half of the twentieth century, the C.C.P.A. and 
the Patent Office agreed that chemical compounds had patent-
able utility despite the lack of a disclosed, specific end use. As 
Justice Harlan explained in his dissent in Manson, “usefulness 
was typically regarded as inherent during a long and prolific 
period of chemical research and development in this country.”85 
But things changed; while the C.C.P.A. maintained this de 
minimis view through the late 1960s, by the early 1950s the 
Patent Office began to relentlessly seek a higher standard.86
 
Holbrook, Expressive Impact, supra note 
  
58, at 607–08 (emphasis added); see 
also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315–18 (1980). The application 
was abandoned in 2005. See Notice of Abandonment for Patent Application 
No. 10/308,135 at 2 (Mar. 1, 2005) (on file with author). 
 82. Bagley, supra note 81, at 492 (quoting Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309). 
 83. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366. 
 84. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 85. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 540 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 86. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
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The best illustration of the tension is In re Nelson,87 a 1960 
case that called into question the intrinsic value of chemical 
compounds. The applicant sought to patent several compounds 
referred to as intermediates—compounds whose asserted utili-
ty is to serve as “building blocks” for other compounds.88 The is-
sue for the court was whether a chemical intermediate has its 
own utility or whether the applicant had to disclose a use for 
the end product in order to obtain a patent on the intermedi-
ate.89 Writing for the court in an opinion that has been de-
scribed as a “judicial bombshell,”90
We have never received a clear answer to the question “Useful to 
whom and for what?” Surely a new group of steroid intermediates is 
useful to chemists doing research on steroids, and in a “practical” 
sense too. Such intermediates are “useful” under section 101. They 
are often actually placed on the market before much, if anything, is 
known as to what they are “good” for, other than experimentation and 
the making of other compounds in the important field of research. Re-
fusal to protect them at this stage would inhibit their wide dissemina-
tion, together with the knowledge of them which a patent disclosure 
conveys, which disclosure the potential protection encourages. This 
would tend to retard rather than promote progress.
 Judge Rich explained that to 
require the latter would frustrate fundamental goals of the pa-
tent system:  
91
In addition to making it clear that the degree of utility is irrele-
vant,
 
92 Nelson revealed that an invention’s benefit to the public 
could be indirect.93
 
 87. 280 F.2d 172, 180 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 
936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
  
 88. Id. For example, A + B react to make I (the intermediate). Then, a 
chemist can react I with C or D (or something else) to make other compounds.  
 89. Id. at 175. 
 90. James F. Davis, Judge Giles S. Rich: His Life and Legacy Revisited, 
LANDSLIDE, Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 11. 
 91. Nelson, 280 F.2d at 180–81. 
 92. Id. at 178 (“[I]t has never been a requirement for patentability that 
there must be any particular degree of utility.”). As stated in the Curtis trea-
tise: 
[I]t follows that every invention, for which a patent is claimed, must 
be, to a certain extent, beneficial to the community; it must be capa-
ble of use, for some beneficial purpose; but when this is the case, the 
degree of utility, whether larger or smaller, is not a subject for con-
sideration, in determining whether the invention will support a pa-
tent. 
CURTIS, supra note 39, § 28; cf. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 341 (“When actual 
utility exists, its degree is unimportant.”). 
 93. Cf. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 341 (“Nor is it necessary that this ad-
vantage, whether great or small, should flow directly from his art or instru-
ment, considered by itself.”). 
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Nelson was a triumph for the research community and very 
important for the growth of the chemical, biotechnological, and 
pharmaceutical industries.94 Aside from reaffirming that the 
standard for utility is de minimis,95 it recognized that “in the 
chemical industry, pure research often has an intrinsic utility 
despite no immediate use for the fruits of the research.”96
What led the Patent Office to aggressively and suddenly 
promulgate a heightened utility threshold for chemical com-
pounds? No one knows. As Judge Rich stated: 
 Had 
Nelson remained good law, it would have done much to bridge 
the gap between patent law and scientific research. But in-
stead, the Patent Office began applying a heightened utility 
standard for chemicals, seemingly without explanation. 
[In a 1951 chemical case,] [t]he examiner had said, “Organic com-
pounds are inherently useful as intermediates for preparing other 
compounds and this inherent utility satisfies the statutory require-
ment.” That is the situation with respect to the administration of the 
patent law before some unidentifiable upper echelon in the Patent Of-
fice turned the thumb screws on the chemists. It did so with no man-
date from Congress or the courts. It just arbitrarily decided to change 
the law.97
Judge Rich contended that by steadily ratcheting up the utility 
requirement since the early 1950s, the Patent Office had raised 
it “above anything required by the statute or by [C.C.P.A. case 
law] and develop[ed] its own brand new theories and philoso-
phy about what the statute means by ‘useful.’”
 
98
2. Brenner v. Manson 
 But the Patent 
Office was not willing to give up on the utility question so easi-
ly. 
The conflict between the C.C.P.A. and the Patent Office led 
the Supreme Court to weigh in on the essential utility question 
in the 1966 case Brenner v. Manson.99
 
 94. Davis, supra note 
 The case was about Man-
90, at 12. 
 95. “To possess utility, a thing or a process must be capable of producing a 
result, and that result must be a good result.” Nelson, 280 F.2d at 180 (quoting 
ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA § 77 (2d ed. 1889)). Thus, according to the court, “the concept[] [of 
utility is] simple.” Id. 
 96. Salim A. Hasan, A Call for Reconsideration of the Strict Utility Stand-
ard in Chemical Patent Practice, 9 HIGH TECH L.J. 245, 253–54 (1994). 
 97. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 952 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Avakian v. Fahrenbach, 172 Comm’r MS Decisions 425, 426 (B.P.A.I. 
1951) (unpublished interference opinion)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
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son’s attempt to provoke an interference—a fight between two 
inventors over who is entitled to a patent.100 The invention at 
issue was a new process for making a steroid (X).101 By the time 
Manson filed his patent application, the Patent Office had al-
ready issued a patent on the process to a competitor.102 Alt-
hough Manson could prove that he was the first to invent the 
process, the examiner would not declare an interference (to sort 
out who did) and rejected Manson’s application because it failed 
to disclose a utility for X.103
Manson argued that X’s utility could be presumed because 
other steroids of similar chemical structure were known to in-
hibit tumors in mice.
  
104 On appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences affirmed the examiner’s rejection because the 
unpredictable nature of steroid chemistry made it impossible to 
presume that X would have the same tumor-inhibiting proper-
ties as the other compounds.105
 
 100. Under the first-to-invent system, patent rights are only awarded to 
the first inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (Supp. V 2011) (barring issuance of a 
patent when another inventor has made the invention before the applicant so 
long as the first inventor has not “abandoned, suppressed, or concealed [the 
invention]”). When two parties claim the same invention, the Patent Office in-
stitutes an “interference” proceeding to determine priority (i.e., which party is 
entitled to a patent). See id. (establishing the basis of “interference practice” 
for determining priority of invention between two parties). The party that re-
duced the invention to practice usually wins; however, a party that was “first 
to conceive the invention but last to reduce it to practice”—either actively or 
constructively—will win if that party “demonstrates reasonable diligence [to-
ward] reduction to practice.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
 Citing Nelson, the C.C.P.A. re-
 101. Manson, 383 U.S. at 520–21. 
 102. Id.; see Process for the Prod. of 2-Methyl-Dihydrotestosterones, U.S. 
Patent No. 2,908,693 (filed Dec. 16, 1957) (issued Oct. 13, 1959). 
 103. Manson, 383 U.S. at 521–22. Before the passage of the America In-
vents Act, when a person believed that he or she was the inventor of the sub-
ject matter claimed by another in a patent application or issued patent, the 
remedy was to file a patent application claiming that subject matter to “pro-
voke” an interference with the other application or issued patent. See 35 
U.S.C. § 135(b)(1) (Supp. V 2011) (amended 2013). Today a patent applicant 
would file a petition to institute a “derivation proceeding” before the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board. See supra note 66 and sources cited therein. 
 104. Manson, 383 U.S. at 521–22. 
 105. The Board stated, “It is our view that the statutory requirement of 
usefulness of a product cannot be presumed merely because it happens to be 
closely related to another compound which is known to be useful.” Id. at 522. 
This is true because “minor changes in the structure of a steroid may produce 
profound changes in its biological activity.” Id. at 532 n.19; cf. AstraZeneca 
Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rec-
ognizing that “the properties of these structurally similar compounds [can] 
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versed and held that “a process which operates as disclosed to 
produce a known product is [itself] ‘useful’ within the meaning 
of section 101”106 so long as “it is not, in operation or result, det-
rimental to the public interest.”107
The Supreme Court reversed. Agreeing with the Patent Of-
fice, the Court held that an inventor seeking to patent a new 
process for making a compound could only do so if the inventor 
could establish utility for the compound.
 
108 Put differently, a 
process for making a compound like X, which is useful only 
as—in the words of the majority—an “object of scientific re-
search,” lacks utility and is therefore unpatentable.109 In dicta, 
but perhaps most importantly, the majority stated that the 
compound itself also lacks utility if it is to serve merely as an 
“object” for further scientific research.110
Interestingly, the majority conceded that in contemporary 
chemistry, “little or nothing is wholly beyond the pale of ‘utili-
ty.’”
  
111 To be sure, even chemicals and chemical processes that 
are only used for research purposes would pass the three-
pronged de minimis test.112 Recall that under that test, some 
beneficial use is sufficient to establish utility unless the inven-
tion is inoperable or detrimental to the public interest.113 But as 
applied to chemical inventions, the majority believed that the 
“beneficial use” and “public interest” prongs “shed little light on 
[the] subject” because they were overinclusive.114
 
vary significantly with minor structural changes”). For additional discussion of 
unpredictability, see supra note 
 The fact that 
the chemical or chemical process can operate to produce the in-
48 and accompanying text. 
 106. In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 236 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 107. Id. at 238. The court’s rationale was that a process (such as a method 
of making something) is a separate category of invention specifically recog-
nized in the statute. Id. at 236; see also 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (Supp. V 2011) 
(“The term ‘process’ means process, art, or method, and includes a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”); 
id. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful pro-
cess . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 108. Manson, 383 U.S. at 531, 534–35. 
 109. Id. at 535. 
 110. Id. The Court explained that the argument(s) against patenting the 
process “would apply equally to the patenting of the product produced by the 
process.” Id. And in the majority’s view, “the decisions of the C.C.P.A. [were] in 
accord with the view that a product may not be patented absent a showing of 
utility greater than any adduced in the present case.” Id. 
 111. Id. at 530. 
 112. See supra Part I.A. 
 113. See supra Part I.A. 
 114. Manson, 383 U.S. at 533. 
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tended result remains a necessary condition for utility but is 
insufficient on its own to warrant a patent.115
The Court then announced the heightened utility standard 
for chemical process inventions: 
  
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the 
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the 
public from an invention with utility. Unless and until a process is re-
fined and developed to this point—where specific benefit exists in cur-
rently available form—there is insufficient justification for permitting 
an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.116
Requiring less, according to the majority, could allow the pa-
tentee to create a “monopoly of knowledge” which could “en-
gross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.”
 
117 The 
patent could confer the power to “block off whole areas of scien-
tific development, without compensating benefit to the pub-
lic.”118 The majority minimized Justice Harlan’s concern that a 
more rigorous utility standard could actually inhibit scientific 
progress by, inter alia, encouraging the inventor to maintain 
secrecy until an acceptable “use” is discovered.119
So the Patent Office won.
 
120 Soon after Manson the 
C.C.P.A. capitulated. In the companion cases In re Kirk121
 
 115. See id. at 532. 
 and 
 116. Id. at 534–35 (second emphasis added).  
 117. Id. at 534. 
 118. Id. The majority’s position addresses concerns that large numbers of 
patents on “upstream” inventions might delay or block “downstream” research 
and the development of commercial end products. See Michael A. Heller & Re-
becca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Bio-
medical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698, 698–99. On the other hand, 
upstream patents promote efficiency by allowing the upstream patentee to co-
ordinate downstream innovation, prevent duplicative research, and encourage 
sharing of useful information. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of 
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276–77 (1977). In addition, there is 
empirical research which challenges the anticommons thesis. See, e.g., John P. 
Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, SCIENCE, Feb. 14, 2003, at 
1021 (finding that patents on research tools “rarely precluded the pursuit of 
worthwhile projects”). 
 119. See Manson, 383 U.S. at 538–39 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). For additional discussion related to Justice Harlan’s con-
cerns about secrecy, see infra Part III.A.3. 
 120. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Patent Office is all too eager to apply 
Manson. See, e.g., Ex parte Aggarwal, No. 90-3041, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 
1339 (B.P.A.I. 1992) (“There is no question that appellants have made an im-
portant discovery with regard to chemical compounds (proteins) which are the 
subject of serious scientific investigation but [it is nevertheless unpatentable 
because of its] unverified and speculative utility.”). 
 121. 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
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In re Joly,122 the court extended Manson (and reversed Nelson) 
by holding that chemical intermediates were unpatentable if 
the end product had no known use.123
The impact of Manson, Kirk, and Joly cannot be overstat-
ed. Utility in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnologi-
cal arts now has nothing to do with the invention’s inherent 
usefulness to a PHOSITA, ability to advance scientific 
knowledge, or potential to indirectly benefit the public. In these 
fields, the utility standard is nothing more than a subjective 
and arbitrary value judgment. As discussed in greater detail 
below, this standard is detrimental to patent law and many of 
the technical communities that it serves. 
  
II.  ASSESSING UTILITY   
A. THE MODERN UTILITY REQUIREMENT 
Like the one it replaced, the modern test for utility has 
three prongs. The first prong, “operability” or “credible utility,” 
is the only one retained from the nineteenth-century test. It re-
quires that the invention be capable of achieving the intended 
result.124 Operability is gauged by asking if a PHOSITA would 
consider the inventor’s assertions believable.125
 
 122. 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
  
 123. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 945; Joly, 376 F.2d at 908–09. In addition, the court 
explained: 
It is not enough that the specification disclose that the intermediate 
exists and that it “works,” reacts, or can be used to produce some in-
tended product of no known use. Nor is it enough that the product 
disclosed to be obtained from the intermediate belongs to some class 
of compounds which now is, or in the future might be, the subject of 
research to determine some specific use. 
Id. at 908 (quoting Kirk, 376 F.2d at 945). 
 124. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (“[A] device lacks utility [if] it does not operate to produce what [the in-
ventor] claims [that] it does.” (citation omitted)); cf. In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 
966 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“It is fundamental in patent law that an alleged inven-
tion . . . must appear capable of doing the things claimed . . . .”). 
 125. The Patent Office can establish reasonable doubt if the applicant’s 
disclosure “suggest[s] an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve[s] 
implausible scientific principles.” In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). A finding 
of inoperability means that the claimed invention lacks a credible utility. Id. 
at 1356; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM UTILITY 
GUIDELINES TRAINING MATERIALS 11 (1999) [hereinafter INTERIM UTILITY 
GUIDELINES] (“[A] utility that is inoperative is not credible.”).  
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The two other prongs, “substantial” and “specific” utility, 
were identified but not fully defined in Manson.126 The Federal 
Circuit did so nearly forty years later in In re Fisher,127 when it 
essentially adopted the Patent Office’s guidelines for assessing 
utility.128 For substantial utility, a PHOSITA must be able to 
use the invention to provide a “significant” and “immediate 
benefit to the public.”129 In other words, the patent application 
“must show that an invention is useful to the public as dis-
closed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some 
future date after further research.”130
Finally, specific utility requires that an invention “provide 
a well-defined and particular benefit to the public.”
 
131 The pur-
pose of this requirement is to deny patents for inventions where 
the asserted use is “so vague as to be meaningless.”132 For ex-
ample, asserted uses like “biological activity” or “useful for 
technical and pharmaceutical purposes” fail the requirement.133
B. PROVING UTILITY 
  
The utility analysis at the patent examination stage can 
take one of two paths.134
 
 126. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–35 (1966). 
 If it is readily apparent that the inven-
tion has a “well-established” utility, § 101 is satisfied and the 
 127. 421 F.3d 1365, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The facts of Fisher are dis-
cussed infra Part III.D.2. 
 128. “The [Patent Office’s] standards for assessing whether a claimed in-
vention has a specific and substantial utility comport with this court’s inter-
pretation . . . . We agree with the Board [of Patent Appeals and Interferences] 
that the facts here are similar to those in Brenner.” Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372, 
1374 (citing with approval U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Utility Exami-
nation Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Utility 
Examination Guidelines]). The guidelines have been incorporated into the 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OF-
FICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 
2012) [hereinafter MPEP]. The MPEP provides guidance to patent examiners 
and is regarded as the Patent Office’s official interpretation of statutes and 
regulations. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). The MPEP and Utility Examination Guidelines “are not binding on [the 
Federal Circuit], but may be given judicial notice to the extent they do not con-
flict with the statute.” Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372. 
 129. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371 (citing Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 
(C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (quoting In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (citation 
omitted)). 
 134. See MPEP, supra note 128, § 2107(II). 
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inquiry ends.135 A “well-established” utility is one “which is well 
known, immediately apparent, or implied by the [applicant’s] 
disclosure of the properties of a material, alone or taken with 
the knowledge of [the PHOSITA].”136 Included in this category 
are most machines, mechanical devices, and other “predictable” 
inventions137 where utility “is so apparent as to virtually jump 
off the page and slap [a PHOSITA] in the face.”138
Alternatively, certain categories of inventions raise red 
flags and are subject to more rigorous scrutiny. As discussed 
earlier, these include inventions in nascent technologies, fields 
that have a poor track record of success,
 
139 and unpredictable 
fields like chemistry, biotechnology, and pharmacology.140 To be 
sure, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure provides ex-
aminers with lists of inventions and utilities that should be 
immediately rejected.141 But this is not the end of the story. 
Under current law, an invention which lacks utility under 
§ 101 also fails as a matter of law to comply with the enable-
ment requirement of § 112(a).142
A lack-of-utility rejection triggers an evidentiary burden-
shifting process. Initially, the applicant’s asserted utility is pre-
sumptively correct.
 The paradoxical nature of this 
dual utility-enablement rejection is addressed in detail below.  
143
 
 135. Id. 
 So, for example, an examiner who ques-
tions whether the invention can achieve its intended result 
must establish a prima facie case of inoperability by coming 
 136. INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES, supra note 125, at 7. 
 137. For a discussion of “predictable” technologies, see supra notes 46–48 
and accompanying text. 
 138. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 48, at 156 n.15 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 
456–57 (2006) (per curiam)); cf. Ash, 546 U.S. at 456–57 (evaluating the “jump 
off the page” standard in the context of an employment discrimination suit). 
 139. Here the issue is often credible utility. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 
862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (generating energy with “cold fusion”); 
Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (perpetual motion ma-
chine). 
 140. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 141. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 128, § 2107.01(I)(B) (identifying basic re-
search, chemical intermediates, and methods of making chemical intermedi-
ates where the end product does not have an identifiable utility); id. 
§ 2107.01(II) (citing Swartz, 232 F.3d 862; Newman, 877 F.2d 1575) (identify-
ing perpetual motion machines and cold fusion as lacking credible utility).  
 142. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  
 143. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also MPEP, supra 
note 128, § 2107.02(III)(A) (instructing examiners not to begin the analysis by 
assuming that the asserted utility is false).  
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forward with factual evidence that shows why a PHOSITA 
would doubt the applicant’s asserted utility.144 Evidentiary 
sources can include peer-reviewed materials, non-peer-
reviewed materials, anecdotal information, information from 
related technologies, and logic.145 If the examiner cannot adduce 
the evidence, then the Patent Office must issue a patent, as 
long as the applicant meets the other requirements for patent-
ability.146
An applicant faced with a utility rejection can either attack 
or rebut the examiner’s prima facie case. An applicant can suc-
cessfully attack it if the examiner produces no (or insufficient) 
evidence to support a finding of nonutility.
 
147 A good example is 
when the examiner relies on common sense or a fact asserted to 
be common knowledge in the field (without providing eviden-
tiary support) as proof of noncompliance.148 The applicant can 
also mount a successful attack if the examiner contends that 
the invention is partially operable,149 crude,150
 
 144. MPEP, supra note 
 or inferior to oth-
128, § 2107(II)(C); see also In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that the examiner bears the initial 
burden of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability); Fregeau v. 
Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying the prima facie 
case to § 101). 
 145. In re Dash, 118 F. App’x 488, 491 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The nature of the 
source “merely go[es] to the weight of the evidence, not whether it can be re-
lied upon at all.” Id. 
 146. Oetiker, 977 F.2d at 1445.  
 147. See sources cited supra note 144. 
 148. The general rule is that the Patent Office “may take notice of facts be-
yond the record which . . . are capable of such instant and unquestionable 
demonstration as to defy dispute.” In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (C.C.P.A. 
1970). But there are limits. First, as to core factual findings, the Patent Office 
cannot reach conclusions simply based on its own experience or assessment of 
what is basic knowledge or common sense. In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). For such facts, the Patent Office should point to concrete evi-
dence in the record to support the rejection. Id. Second, if the examiner relies 
on common knowledge without documentary support, the rejection can survive 
only if it is based on sound technical reasoning and the applicant does not de-
mand that the examiner provide authority. See, e.g., In re Chevenard, 139 F.2d 
711, 713 (C.C.P.A. 1943). Third, the applicant must have an opportunity to 
challenge a fact asserted to be common knowledge. See, e.g., id. But see KSR 
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–20 (2007) (explaining that in the 
nonobviousness context, reliance on common sense can be appropriate). 
 149. See sources cited supra note 41. 
 150. Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27, 34 (1921) (“The machine patented 
may be imperfect in its operation; but if it embodies the generic principle[] and 
works . . . though only in a crude way . . . it is enough.”); Nat’l Recovery Techs., 
Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
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ers.151 Reliance on any of these rationales, whether alone or in 
combination, is insufficient to satisfy the Patent Office’s initial 
burden.152
An alternative strategy is to concede the prima facie case 
and rebut it. So, for example, if operability is at issue, the bur-
den shifts to the applicant to come forward with persuasive ar-
guments or additional evidence sufficient to convince a 
PHOSITA to accept the applicant’s assertions.
 
153 When the ap-
plicant submits rebuttal evidence, the examiner must “start 
over” and “consider all of the evidence anew.”154 The examiner 
must determine patentability based on the entire record, with a 
preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof.155 
Whether an invention complies with the utility requirement of 
§ 101 is a question of fact.156
C. THE PERILS OF THE HEIGHTENED UTILITY STANDARD 
  
Recall that one criticism of the pre-Manson test for utility 
was its susceptibility to subjective, value-based patentability 
assessments that had little to do with an invention’s true use-
fulness to the PHOSITA.157 This concern was certainly evident 
in the moral and public welfare prongs,158 but also surfaced in 
the operability prong, which often devolved into a subjective 
judgment about the subject matter.159
 
(explaining that operability still exists even if the invention does not work per-
fectly under all conditions). 
  
 151. See Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“An invention need not be the best or the only way to accomplish a certain re-
sult, and it need only be useful to some extent and in certain applica-
tions . . . .”); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 
955, 960 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is possible for an invention to be less effec-
tive than existing devices but nevertheless meet the statutory criteria for pa-
tentability.”). 
 152. If the examiner does not meet this initial burden, the applicant does 
not need to provide any additional evidence to substantiate its assertions, 
which are presumptively correct. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 153. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing 
Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566). 
 154. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing In re Rine-
hart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
 155. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 156. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 157. See supra Part I.B. 
 158. See supra Part I.A. 
 159. See Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra note 23, at 1513–14; discus-
sion supra Part I.B.  
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What is troubling about the modern test is that it repeats 
the sins of the past. While the operability prong is clearly sub-
jective, so too is the determination of whether an invention has 
specific or substantial utility. By allowing the decisionmaker to 
arbitrarily determine when an invention is ripe for patenting, 
§ 101 has morphed into a boundless gatekeeper in patent law.160
III.  SUPPLANTING UTILITY   
  
The emergence of technology-specific utility standards—de 
minimis for some inventions but considerably more stringent 
for others—has come at a cost. The bias against granting pa-
tents for certain types of inventions disconnects patent law 
from much of the technological community that it serves and 
ultimately frustrates fundamental goals of the patent system. 
Would the patent system be better served without a stand-
alone utility requirement? As it turns out, scrapping the utility 
requirement entirely would better serve the goals of patent law. 
A. WHY ELIMINATE UTILITY AS A CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY? 
1. Utility Is Not Constitutionally Required 
Any effort to eliminate the utility requirement must begin 
by asking if it is mandated by the Constitution. There is a 
widespread belief in patent law that utility has a constitutional 
basis.161 The Federal Circuit and others who espouse this view 
point to the Intellectual Property Clause, which empowers 
Congress to authorize the granting of patents “to promote the 
[p]rogress of . . . useful [a]rts.”162
 
 160. See supra note 
 Some have argued that this 
22 and accompanying text. 
 161. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (“The basic 
quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting 
a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility.”); In re Bremner, 182 F.2d 216, 217 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (“[W]e 
feel certain that the law requires that there be in the application an assertion of 
utility and an indication of the use or uses intended. It was never intended 
that a patent be granted upon a product, or a process producing a product, un-
less such product be useful. See subsection 8 of section 8 of Article I, United 
States Constitution . . . .”).  
 162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see Stiftung v. 
Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The utility requirement 
has its origin in article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, which indicates that 
the purpose of empowering Congress to authorize the granting of patents is ‘to 
promote progress of . . . useful arts.’”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Re-
search: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. 
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constitutional provision “must be construed in the sense that 
‘useful’ modifies, not ‘arts’ but, the inventions in the arts.”163 
Relatedly, given that the word “useful” also appears in § 101,164 
it is easy to assume that the word has an identical meaning in 
both contexts.165
Here, it is important to explain what is meant by “useful 
arts” in the Constitution. In his book The Nature of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause,
  
166 noted legal historian Edward 
Walterscheid explains that when the clause’s language was 
adopted in 1787, “useful arts” was a “unitary technical term”167 
that basically referred to “useful or helpful trades”168 like the 
“industrial, mechanical, and manual arts of the 18th centu-
ry.”169 As to the meaning of “useful arts” using modern lan-
guage, in his article Patents and Science: A Clarification of the 
Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, patent scholar Karl Lutz 
explains that the term is best represented by the word “tech-
nology.”170 Thus, the patent portion of the Intellectual Property 
Clause can be read to mean “[t]o promote the progress of tech-
nology”171 or “[t]o accelerate technological progress.”172
 
REV. 77, 101 n.128 (1999) (“To the extent that the patent clause of the Consti-
tution focuses on ‘useful Arts,’ the statutory utility requirement may have a 
constitutional dimension.” (citing Stiftung, 945 F.2d at 1180)); cf. Manson, 383 
U.S. at 536 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Certainly 
this reading of ‘useful’ in the statute is within the scope of the constitutional 
grant, which states only . . . ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts’ . . . .”). 
  
 163. Maurice W. Levy, Utility—The Inverted Criterion, 30 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 592, 592 (1948). 
 164. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 165. But see discussion infra note 173. 
 166. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002).  
 167. Id. at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robert I. Coul-
ter, The Field of Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 487, 496 (1952)). 
 168. Id. (citing Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Pa-
tentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 10 (1966)). 
 169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coulter, supra note 
167, at 496). 
 170. Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949); see also Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3244 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Numerous 
scholars have suggested that the term ‘useful arts’ was widely understood to 
encompass the fields that we would now describe as relating to technology or 
‘technological arts.’”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (“What the framers described as ‘useful arts,’ we in modern times call 
‘technology.’”), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 171. Lutz, supra note 170, at 54. 
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In this light, the next question is whether “useful” as it ap-
pears in the Intellectual Property Clause mandates an inde-
pendent, constitutionally-based utility requirement. The an-
swer appears to be no.173 Though the Manson Court intimated 
that substantial utility might have a constitutional basis,174 the 
Court conspicuously failed to cite language in the Constitution 
to support this conclusion.175 In fact, Walterscheid argues that 
“[i]t is important to note that [the Manson] holding was predi-
cated on statutory interpretation and not on interpretation of 
the constitutional meaning of ‘useful’ in the intellectual proper-
ty clause.”176
2. Utility Is Substantively Bankrupt 
  
The essence of the U.S. patent system is a quid pro quo be-
tween the patentee and the public.177
 
 172. Id.; see also Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(en banc) (“The exclusive right, constitutionally derived, was for the national 
purpose of advancing the useful arts—the process today called technological 
innovation.”). 
 The basic idea is that in 
order to promote the full disclosure of information about the in-
vention to the public, the patentee must be given something in 
 173. Several commentators have argued that “useful” has different mean-
ings in the Constitution and the patent statute. See, e.g., Velvel, supra note 31, 
at 13 (observing that, since the Manson Court chose to resolve the case on 
statutory rather than constitutional grounds, that “in itself is an indication 
that the Court regards this as basically a statutory matter”). Another com-
mentator presents an insightful perspective: 
  Most courts have assumed that the meaning of "useful" in section 
101 of the Patent Act is identical to the meaning of the underlying 
constitutional language. A more sophisticated reading of the Consti-
tution and the Patent Act, however, reveals a tension between the 
two. . . . 
. . . In contrast with the language of the Constitution, the focus in the 
Patent Act is on the individual invention. Section 101 of the Patent 
Act, then, presents the “micro” view of the utility requirement. 
Nathan Machin, Note, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility 
Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 437–38 
(1999). 
 174. See supra notes 161–62. 
 175. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 166, at 346 n.151. 
 176. Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
 177. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974); see 
also Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829) (explaining that if the 
public already had possession of the invention at the time the patent was 
sought, “there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did 
not intend to grant an exclusive right,” given the absence of a quid pro quo). 
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return.178 What the patentee gets is the limited period of exclu-
sory rights conferred by the patent grant.179 The public gets a 
full disclosure of the invention180 as soon as the patent docu-
ment publishes181 and possession of it at the end of the patent 
term.182
Indeed, an oft-touted justification for the patent system is 
that society will get some benefit from the invention’s disclo-
sure.
 
183 In theory, the disclosure adds to the public storehouse 
of useful knowledge which, in turn, promotes technological pro-
gress.184 But it is very easy for the public to get the short end of 
the stick in this so-called patent bargain.185 One reason, accord-
ing to Judge Rich, is because “[t]here always exists, on the part 
of some people, a selfish desire to obtain patent protection 
without making a full disclosure.”186
 
 178. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480–81 (discussing what the inventor re-
ceives in exchange for fully disclosing his invention). 
 This is why the law strives 
 179. Id. at 480 (“In return for the right of exclusion—this ‘reward for inven-
tions’—the patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 180. See, e.g., J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 
124, 142 (2001) (noting that in order to obtain a patent on a plant, the breeder 
must describe the plant well enough for the public to be able to use it after the 
patent expires, which includes depositing publicly-available biological materi-
als). 
 181. See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 621, 624 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function] (em-
phasizing that “the patent document has potential immediate value to the 
public, which can use the information for any purpose that does not infringe 
upon the claims” (emphasis added)); cf. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481 (explaining 
that when the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it 
adds to the “general store of knowledge” and assumedly will stimulate ideas 
and promote technological development). 
 182. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 418 (1822) (“The object is to 
put the public in complete possession of the invention . . . so that interference 
with it may be avoided while the patent continues, and its benefits may be ful-
ly enjoyed by the public, after the patent expires.”).  
 183. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481 (explaining that the federal government 
“is willing to pay the high price” of exclusivity conferred by a patent for its dis-
closure, which, “it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual develop-
ment of further significant advances in the art”). 
 184. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., 
concurring). 
 185. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 48, at 143–54 (iden-
tifying problems with the current disclosure standard). 
 186. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In re 
Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967); cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Pre-
sumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 804 (2011) [hereinafter 
Holbrook, Presumptions] (“[Applicants] have reasons to provide just enough 
information to satisfy § 112 and no more so that the patentee could retain as-
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to secure the public’s part of the patent bargain by compelling 
patentees to comply with the statutory patentability require-
ments.187
To illustrate, consider the basic purpose of each of the pa-
tentability requirements. Novelty ensures that the invention is 
“new, that is, bestowed for the first time upon the public by the 
patentee”
 Put differently, the requirements work individually 
and collectively to ensure that the public gets a meaningful dis-
closure.  
188 and protects knowledge that the public already 
possesses.189 Nonobviousness screens for trivial extensions of 
extant knowledge190 and denies patents for inventions that 
would have come about through ordinary technological pro-
gress.191 The disclosure requirements192 ensure that at the time 
of filing, the public can use the technical details disclosed in the 
patent document to improve upon the invention, to design 
around it, or to engage in other innovative activities during the 
patent term193
 
pects of the invention as a trade secret, potentially providing a competitive ad-
vantage in the market even after the patent is published or expires.”). 
 and practice the invention once the patent term 
 187. See SHELDON W. HALPERN, SEAN B. SEYMORE & KENNETH L. PORT, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPY-
RIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 154–55 (4th ed. 2012); see also Holbrook, 
Presumptions, supra note 186, at 804 (arguing that one can view the Federal 
Circuit’s formalistic disclosure rules as “information-forcing default penalties” 
for applicants who strategically withhold information). 
 188. ROBINSON, supra note 1, § 221; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (re-
quirement for novelty). 
 189. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 
(1989) (noting that Thomas Jefferson, the “driving force behind early federal 
patent policy,” believed that “a grant of patent rights in an idea already dis-
closed to the public [i]s akin to an ex post facto law, ‘obstruct[ing] others in the 
use of what they possessed before’” (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 327 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh 
eds., Library ed. 1904))); CURTIS, supra note 39, § 378. 
 190. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966); see also infra 
Part III.D.1. 
 191. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007); see also 
infra Part III.D.1. 
 192. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (Supp. V 2011).  
 193. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 
(2009). As Judge Giles Rich once explained, “even if [the invention] does not go 
into the public domain during the patent term, the public gets the advantage 
of knowing what the invention is and how to practice it.” Janice M. Mueller, A 
Rich Legacy, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 895, 900 (1999) (quoting E-mail from 
Giles S. Rich, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, to 
Janice M. Mueller, Assoc. Professor, The John Marshall Law Sch. (Aug. 16, 
1997)).  
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expires.194 The patentable subject matter requirement195 en-
sures that the inventor makes a meaningful and genuine con-
tribution to the public by excluding things like abstract ideas, 
laws of nature, mathematical formulas, and physical phenome-
na.196 Together, these requirements ensure that the USPTO on-
ly awards patents for inventions that add to the public store-
house of knowledge197 and support the patent system’s broader 
mission of promoting scientific progress and extending the fron-
tiers of knowledge.198
Conspicuously absent from the preceding discussion is the 
utility requirement. Though it has been suggested that it also 
helps to secure the public’s part of the patent bargain,
 
199 one 
can challenge this assertion for two related reasons. First, as 
previously discussed, over the past half-century the utility re-
quirement has been used, not to ensure that the public gets a 
meaningful disclosure, but rather to effect a subjective and ar-
bitrary value judgment as to when or if something is patenta-
ble.200
 
 194. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 
 To be sure, plenty of patent applications denied for a lack 
of utility disclose copious amounts of substantive technical in-
formation that would benefit the PHOSITA and add to the pub-
 195. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (allowing patents only for a “process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter”). 
 196. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (citing Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 
594 (1978) (noting that such things are unpatentable without some inventive 
concept in their applications); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (explaining that fundamental principles are “part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men[,] . . . free to all men and reserved exclu-
sively to none”), quoted in Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
 197. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innovation, ad-
vancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent 
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote 
the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’” (alteration in original)). 
 198. This goal emanates from the Intellectual Property Clause of the Con-
stitution: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries[.]” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
constitutional command is the patent system’s “ultimate purpose”); Motion 
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) 
(“[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws . . . is ‘to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts’ . . . .”). 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 200. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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lic storehouse of knowledge.201 A patent denial at this stage 
clearly has costs.202
Second, as discussed in the next Part, the utility require-
ment is superfluous because inventions can be effectively 
screened with other patentability requirements.
 
203
Lacking an apparent constitutional basis for utility, what 
remains is the statute.
 It is for the-
se reasons—indifference to the technical substance of the dis-
closure, subjectivity, and superfluity—that the current utility 
requirement is substantively bankrupt. 
204 Since Congress has provided no in-
sight into the meaning of the term “useful” over the past two 
centuries205 and probably will not do so any time in the foresee-
able future,206 it will remain a matter of judicial interpreta-
tion.207 As discussed below, this Article proposes a de minimis 
utility standard which for all practical purposes would elimi-
nate utility as a patentability requirement.208
3. It Fosters Secrecy and Delayed Disclosure 
 
Disclosure is regarded as the “centerpiece of patent poli-
cy.”209
 
 201. Cf. infra notes 
 The patent system goes to great lengths to promote and 
safeguard the disclosure function. Early disclosure lies at its 
214–19 and accompanying text (discussing how much 
technical information is lost when inventors do not file patents because they 
believe their inventions cannot meet the utility requirement). 
 202. See supra text accompanying note 91 (quoting Judge Rich’s views set 
forth in In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 180–81 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In re 
Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967)). 
 203. See discussion infra Parts III.C–D. 
 204. Cf. Velvel, supra note 31, at 13 (observing that Congress could over-
turn the holding in Manson through legislation because the Court treated the 
issue in that case “not as a [c]onstitutional one but as a statutory one”).  
 205. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 166, at 345 (noting that congressional 
inaction has led to the difficulty in defining the term “useful”). 
 206. In 2011, Congress made the most sweeping reform to U.S. patent law 
since 1952. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). Yet, even in the 
America Invents Act, Congress neglected to clarify the meaning of “useful.” 
See id. (containing no amendments to the “useful” requirement of § 101). 
 207. See sources cited supra note 45. 
 208. See infra Part III.B. 
 209. Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2011 (2005); see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 
U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (explaining that the patent system should be viewed as “a 
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public dis-
closure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive 
monopoly for a limited period of time”). 
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core;210 inventors who do not file promptly compromise their pa-
tent rights.211 And, of course, a patent is granted only if the dis-
closure is fully enabling and represents a complete written de-
scription of the invention.212
If disclosure is the centerpiece of patent policy, then secre-
cy is its antithesis.
 
213 It would seem that any patentability re-
quirement which fosters secrecy should have no place in patent 
law. But utility does just that! As Justice Harlan aptly noted in 
Manson, an inventor seeking to patent something that cannot 
meet the majority’s new test has every incentive to make the 
“abstractly logical choice . . . to maintain secrecy until a product 
use can be discovered.”214
Nevertheless, concerns about secrecy are often downplayed 
because it is assumed that the invention will be inevitably dis-
closed—either in a patent or somewhere else.
  
215 Whether this 
assumption is correct is an empirical question that is hard to 
answer.216
 
 210. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (“Early public disclosure is the linchpin of the patent system.”). For posi-
tive commentary on early filing, see John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect 
Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 445 (2004) (arguing that it leads to 
reduced patent terms, thereby dedicating the invention to the public at an ear-
lier time); Kitch, supra note 
 But several points can be made. First, many nonaca-
demic patentees choose not to disclose the technical details of 
their inventions outside of the patent system. Indeed, most in-
formation disclosed in a patent does not appear in another me-
118, at 269–77 (explaining that it facilitates com-
mercialization, coordinates the development of technology, and reduces waste-
ful duplicative efforts by competitors). 
 211. For example, an applicant must file a patent application within one 
year of disclosing the invention in a printed publication. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) 
(Supp. V 2011). A fundamental purpose of § 102(b) is to encourage prompt fil-
ing. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
 212. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C.1. 
 213. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 
919 (2011); Jason Mazzone & Matthew Moore, The Secret Life of Patents, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 33, 35 (2008) (explaining how federal patent law “expresses a 
clear preference for the inventor who discloses an invention to the public and 
obtains a patent over the inventor who keeps the invention a secret”). 
 214. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 538 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 215. See, e.g., id. at 534 (majority opinion) (noting that concerns about the 
virtues of disclosure and secrecy are “easily exaggerated”). 
 216. It is virtually impossible to find out how many inventors forego pa-
tenting altogether because of a lack of utility. 
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dium.217 This is particularly true in industry, where scientists 
publish relatively little.218 Thus, much technical information, 
undisclosed through the patent system, never enters the public 
storehouse of knowledge and will likely be lost.219
Second, some inventors concoct trivial uses simply to satis-
fy the utility requirement.
  
220 For example, an inventor of a new 
chemical intermediate221 (which is unpatentable as such)222 
might assert that it is a good lubricant, detergent, or fuel just 
to avoid raising any red flags.223 Importantly for the inventor, 
once granted, the patent covers any use of the intermediate, in-
cluding uses the patentee never envisioned.224
 
 217. Fromer, supra note 
 Nevertheless, 
Judge Rich believed that having to concoct utilities to meet the 
193, at 554; see also Esteban Burrone & Guriqbal 
Singh Jaiya, Intellectual Property (IP) Rights and Innovation in Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises 3 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/iprs_innovation 
.pdf (“It has been estimated that patent documents contain 70% of the world's 
accumulated technical knowledge and that most of the information contained 
in patent documents is either never published elsewhere or is first disclosed 
through the publication of the patent application.”). 
 218. See generally Benoît Godin, Research and the Practice of Publication 
in Industries, 25 RES. POL’Y 587 (1996) (presenting various explanations and 
using bibliometrics to assess the usefulness of publication in industry). The 
highest priority for an industrial inventor is to generate results that show 
commercial promise and will ultimately find their way into a marketable 
product. Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, Information Disclosure and the 
Economics of Science and Technology, in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN 
ECONOMIC THEORY 519, 522 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987); see also Diana 
Hicks, Published Papers, Tacit Competencies and Corporate Management of 
the Public/Private Character of Knowledge, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 401, 
412 (1995) (“After all, writing papers makes no money and consumes time.”). 
 219. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 666 (discussing 
situations in which “the patent system is the sole medium of disclosure”). 
 220. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 960–61 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissent-
ing) (describing such behavior). 
 221. For a definition, see supra note 88. 
 222. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing Brenner v. Manson, In re Kirk, and In 
re Joly). 
 223. Cf. Anderson & Dyson, supra note 49, at 817 (“[W]here patent protec-
tion is imperative, Kirk and Joly encourage the disclosure of trivial uses, de-
veloped only in an attempt to satisfy the new judicial interpretation of the 
statute.”). 
 224. Cf. Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (“The inventor of a ma-
chine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter 
whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not.”); Catalina Mktg. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] patent 
grants the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sale, 
or importing the claimed apparatus or composition for any use of that appa-
ratus or composition, whether or not the patentee envisioned such use.”). 
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legal standard is a poor expenditure of technical brainpower225 
and wastes time and effort “which ought to be directed at a 
more worthy end.”226 It also frustrates the disclosure function 
by filling the patent document (and ultimately the public store-
house of knowledge) with unhelpful information.227
Third, to the extent that certain aspects of an invention fall 
into a disfavored category prone to lack-of-utility rejections 
(such as a nascent, paradigm-shifting, or seemingly impossible 
subject matter), the inventor has every incentive to conceal that 
feature rather than to disclose or claim it.
  
228 Fourth, even if the 
invention is ultimately patented after a use is found, the disclo-
sure is inevitably delayed.229 In other words, the technical in-
formation enters the public storehouse later rather than soon-
er. Of course, this conflicts directly with the patent system’s 
goal of promoting early disclosure.230
B. RETHINKING USEFULNESS 
 Clearly, concealment or 
delayed disclosure of otherwise new, nonobvious, and enabled 
subject matter into the public storehouse hinders innovation 
and frustrates basic goals of the patent system. 
1. What Should It Mean to Be (Patentably) Useful? 
The word “useful” in § 101 modifies the various types of in-
ventions that can be patented—machines, manufactures, and 
compositions of matter.231
 
 225. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 960–61. 
 But given that the term is inherently 
abstract and imprecise, history has shown that any attempt to 
set a usefulness threshold for an invention is a futile exercise. 
Since every invention can be used by someone (either a 
PHOSITA or member of the general public) for something, 
promulgating a technology-sensitive utility paradigm is inher-
ently subjective and leads to nonsensical, biased, and often ir-
rational outcomes.  
 226. Id. at 961. 
 227. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 632 (criticizing 
disclosure practices which add no technical value to the patent literature). 
 228. Cf. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 961 (“The rule of the majority is actually an in-
centive, furthermore, to conceal information as to the important uses actually 
in contemplation by the researchers for they dare not even mention such sen-
sitive subjects . . . .”).  
 229. In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906, 924 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 230. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 231. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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It is for these reasons that the term “useful” should once 
again be given a de minimis interpretation. A useful invention 
for § 101 purposes should be one that is “fit[] for some desirable 
purpose or valuable end” or otherwise provides “some beneficial 
use” to the public.232 Such a standard is, in fact, the first prong 
of the nineteenth-century test. But the threshold advocated 
herein is even lower because it rejects the two other prongs of 
that test—public interest (which has already disappeared from 
modern patent law)233 and operability.234
2. A Better Theory of Usefulness 
 This would all but 
erase utility from the patentability calculus. 
Admittedly this is a bold proposal—to essentially eviscer-
ate “useful” from § 101 and to more or less eliminate utility as 
an independent patentability requirement.235
As an initial matter, recall that the inventive act produces 
two things that are potentially useful to the public: the inven-
tion itself, which will be defined here as the subject matter 
claimed in the patent (i.e., machine, product, process, composi-
tion of matter)
 This subsection 
presents a normative theory of how usefulness should be evalu-
ated in patent law. 
236 and the disclosure, which furnishes technical 
details about the invention (i.e., how to make it, how to use 
it).237
Though the invention is probably the first thing that comes 
to mind when patents are discussed, the importance of the dis-
closure cannot be overlooked.
  
238
 
 232. See supra notes 
 The Court has said that “the ul-
7, 33 and accompanying text. 
 233. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 234. Operability is superfluous because determining whether an invention 
can achieve its intended result can be gauged through compliance with the en-
ablement requirement of § 112. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 235. The author is in good company because the late Judge Giles S. Rich 
was accused of attempting to do likewise. See In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 190 
(C.C.P.A. 1960) (Kirkpatrick, J., dissenting) (“It seems to me beyond question 
that the result of the court’s decision and opinion is to write the requirements 
of the Patent Statute, that inventions must be useful, out of the law.”), over-
ruled by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 236. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining patent-eligible subject matter). 
 237. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 238. Patent scholars differ in their views on the role of the disclosure. 
Compare Fromer, supra note 193, at 547–54 (cataloguing the beneficial uses 
for disclosure in patent law, including stimulating innovation, preventing du-
plication, gauging patentability, and signaling research-and-development 
strength), and Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. 
REV. 123, 133–47 (2006) (describing the “pervasive” role of disclosure in patent 
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timate goal of the patent system is to bring new ideas and 
technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”239 And, 
as previously discussed, the statutory patentability require-
ments work collectively to safeguard the disclosure function.240
Why is disclosure so important? First, since the public gets 
many new and useful things through trade secrecy,
  
241 the pa-
tent system incentivizes the disclosure of information that the 
public might not otherwise get.242 This is particularly important 
for “non-self-disclosing” inventions like chemical compounds or 
industrial processes which a PHOSITA cannot easy replicate or 
reverse engineer.243
Second, the disclosure conveys technical information (and 
becomes a part of the technical literature),
 
244 which “add[s] to 
the sum of useful knowledge”245
 
law and policy, including enriching the state of the art contemporaneously 
with the invention and showing evidence of possession of the invention), with 
Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 412 (2010) (arguing that “disclosure as an objective of 
patent policy should be discarded in certain circumstances” because it 
“serves . . . an ancillary role within the larger purpose of the patent regime”), 
and Note, supra note 
 immediately—not at the end of 
209, at 2007 (“If disclosure is an important policy goal of 
the patent system, then the system is in desperate need of repair.”). 
 239. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 
(1989).  
 240. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 241. Famous examples are the public’s enjoyment of Coca-Cola’s syrup 
formula and use of Google’s search algorithm. See Michael Abramowicz & 
John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 
1622 (2011) (“[T]rade secrecy protection can theoretically provide even more 
powerful incentives than patents because trade secrecy rights are potentially 
infinite in duration.”); Anderson, supra note 213, at 923–27 (exploring the pa-
tent vs. trade secret distinction). 
 242. See discussion supra Part III.A.3. For a narrower view of disclosure, 
see Note, supra note 209, at 2014–16 (explaining that requiring disclosure is 
unnecessary for inventions that are easy to reverse engineer “because the in-
vention would be disclosed to the public regardless” and also for inventions 
which are hard to reverse engineer because the inventor will protect them 
though trade secrecy).  
 243. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use 
and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83; id. at 105–06 (“For such 
non-self-disclosing inventions, the disclosure of the invention in the patent 
[document] is valuable to society . . . because it adds something the inventor 
could have kept secret to the store of public technical knowledge.”). 
 244. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 
400 (1960). Like technical journals, for example, patent disclosures can show 
the state of technology, set forth what others have already achieved, and pro-
vide technical information that others can avoid repeating. Seymore, Teaching 
Function, supra note 181, at 623–24. 
 245. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).  
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the patent term but as soon as the patent document publish-
es.246 Patent theory contemplates that the early entry of useful 
knowledge into the public storehouse reduces research-and-
development waste,247 spurs creativity,248 leads others “to climb 
onto the patentee’s shoulders in seeking improvements or whol-
ly new inventions,”249 and, of course, extends the frontiers of 
science and technology.250
When viewed in this light, one could argue that patent law 
should be less concerned with useful inventions and more con-
cerned with ensuring that the public gets a useful disclosure.
  
251
C. ENSURING USEFULNESS THROUGH ENABLEMENT 
 
As discussed in the next two sections, this objective is best ob-
tained not through the extant utility requirement, but rather 
through compliance with enablement and nonobviousness. 
This Section argues that enablement can function in two 
ways to ensure usefulness. First, the disclosure standard can be 
raised in such a way to guarantee that the public gets a mean-
ingful, technically robust disclosure. Second, enablement can 
objectively gauge whether the invention works—thereby elimi-
nating the need for § 101’s operability requirement.  
1. Why Focus on Enablement? 
Enablement is one of the three statutory disclosure re-
quirements appearing in the first paragraph of § 112: 
  The specification shall contain a written description of the inven-
tion, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, 
 
 246. See supra notes 181–82, 193–94 and accompanying text. 
 247. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 267 n.79 (1994). 
 248. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); see also 
MICHAEL A. GOLLIN, DRIVING INNOVATION 15–19 (2008) (explaining that dis-
closure adds to the pool of accessible knowledge that other creative individuals 
can use and improve upon). 
 249. Dam, supra note 247, at 264; cf. Rich, supra note 244, at 400 (“The lit-
erature of the art is enriched, another way of doing something is made known 
and even if it be inferior to the means already known, there is no telling when 
it may give another inventor an idea or when someone will improve on it in 
such a way as to surpass all that is known.”). 
 250. See Rich, supra note 244, at 400 (“Whenever novel subject matter, un-
obvious to the workers of ordinary skill in an art, is published, progress in the 
art is promoted.”). 
 251. It is worth repeating that most information disclosed in a patent is 
never published elsewhere. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
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to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contem-
plated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the inven-
tion.252
Aside from policing claim scope,
 
253 the enablement requirement 
ensures that a PHOSITA can actually practice (make and 
use)254 what the applicant discloses at the time of filing255 with-
out undue experimentation.256
Like utility, enablement is a standard.
  
257 Determining 
whether a disclosure is enabling is a legal conclusion that rests 
on underlying factual inquiries.258 The Federal Circuit set forth 
several factors relevant to the enablement analysis in In re 
Wands.259
 
 252. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (Supp. V 2011) (emphasis added) (formerly § 112, 
¶ 1). 
 They are: (1) the amount of direction or guidance pre-
sented in the disclosure, (2) the existence of working examples, 
(3) the nature of the invention, (4) the predictability or unpre-
dictability of the art, (5) the PHOSITA’s level of skill, (6) the 
state of the prior art, (7) the breadth of the claims, and (8) the 
quantity of experimentation necessary to practice the claimed 
 253. Claim scope is the “technological territory” that the inventor claims is 
his or hers to control. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990). The enable-
ment provided serves as a constraint on claim scope. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) 62, 121 (1854); see also Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Sepa-
ration Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that enable-
ment’s purpose is to “ensure[] that the public knowledge is enriched by the pa-
tent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the 
claims”). The scope of enablement is the sum of what is taught in the written 
description of the invention plus what is known by a PHOSITA without undue 
experimentation. Id. 
 254. The courts often use the term “practice” when referring to the how-to-
make and how-to-use prongs of the enablement requirement. See, e.g., In re 
Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
 255. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977); accord Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining the 
enablement determination “is made retrospectively, i.e., by looking back to the 
filing date of the patent application and determining whether undue experi-
mentation would have been required to make and use the claimed invention at 
that time”). 
 256. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). While “undue ex-
perimentation” does not appear in the statute, “it is well established that ena-
blement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make and use 
the invention without undue experimentation.” In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 257. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 
1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984); MPEP, supra note 128, § 2164.01; Seymore, 
Heightened Enablement, supra note 48, at 130.  
 258. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 259. 858 F.2d at 737. 
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invention.260 While not mandatory,261 the Wands factors are 
ubiquitous in evaluating enablement262—probably because they 
touch on issues that are important in virtually all enablement 
determinations.263 These include issues related to the technical 
scope and substance of the disclosure (factors one and two),264 
the nature of the technology (factors three and four),265 the 
PHOSITA’s knowledge and skill (factor five),266 and the scope of 
the claim sought (factor seven).267
For present purposes, the Wands factors are useful in three 
respects. First, they provide the decision maker with a list of 
objective criteria that help gauge the technical usefulness of the 
disclosure. Second, they are well suited to handle inventions 
that are prone to operability challenges—namely, those emerg-
ing from new, poorly understood, and paradigm-shifting tech-
nologies, as well as those from fields with a poor track record of 
success. Third, they can be manipulated to set a high disclosure 
threshold, thereby guaranteeing that the public gets a useful 
disclosure. 
 
 
 260. Id. (factors reordered from original text).  
 261. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (noting that the Wands factors are illustrative and not mandatory). 
 262. See 3 CHISUM, supra note 68, § 7.03 (collecting cases). 
 263. The factors are interrelated. For example, if the PHOSITA is really 
smart (factor five), an applicant need not disclose what the PHOSITA already 
knows or can easily figure out (factors one and two). Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. 
Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 264. The technical substance of the disclosure lies at the heart of the ena-
blement analysis. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. The two factors 
are clustered together because working examples are a form of guidance. 
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 641–46. 
 265. One way to determine the requisite amount of teaching is to ask 
whether the technology is “unpredictable” or “predictable.” See supra notes 
46–48 and accompanying text. 
 266. This factor has become increasingly important over the past decade as 
the Federal Circuit has compelled patentees to enable the full scope of the 
claimed invention. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 
941–42 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court properly determined 
the PHOSITA’s level of skill and did not err in giving less weight to a witness 
who analyzed an issue using the wrong level of skill); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac 
& Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (determining that where the 
claims covered a Type 1 or a Type 2 aluminum coating, yet the patent only de-
scribed a Type 2 coating, the claims were nonenabled because a PHOSITA 
could not fill in the gaps without undue experimentation).  
 267. Enablement places an outer limit on claim scope. Nat’l Recovery 
Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
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2. Raising the Standard 
a. The Primacy of Working Examples  
Clearly, the best way to teach a technical subject is with 
actual experimental details.268 Such information lies at the core 
of technical publications because it provides the best form of 
guidance and direction for replicating what is disclosed there-
in.269 In patent law, actual experimental details or “working ex-
amples” (which correspond to the first and second Wands fac-
tors) provide the best evidence of enablement.270 When 
operability is in doubt,271 they can provide objective proof that 
the invention really works.272
 
 268. See, e.g., George Gore, On Practical Scientific Instruction, 7 Q.J. SCI. 
215, 228 (1870) (asserting that one who teaches a technical subject must teach 
with examples that should be full of practical applications and familiar illus-
trations); Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 
 And, very importantly, working 
181, at 641–54 (making a 
similar argument in the patent law context).  
 269. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAY & BARBARA GASTEL, HOW TO WRITE AND 
PUBLISH A SCIENTIFIC PAPER 61 (6th ed. 2006) (noting that disclosing the ex-
perimental methods is important because the scientific community must ad-
judge the results reproducible before attaching scientific merit to the work); 
ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 51 
(2d ed. 2009) (“The ability of other investigators to replicate the experiments 
by following the method in the published report is crucial to the advancement 
of science.”). 
 270. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 653; see also Bratislav 
Stanković, The Use of Examples in Patent Applications, 18 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J. 9, 10 (2006) (noting that in patent documents, the presence of 
working examples “facilitates, if not ensures, enablement of an invention”). 
But, as with other forms of enablement, the breadth of the teaching provided 
in a working example must be commensurate with the claim scope sought. See 
cases cited supra note 253. A teaching that lacks specificity or provides inade-
quate guidance will result in a narrow(ed) claim scope (Wands factor eight). 
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 115 (2009). 
 271. See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(stating operability is a fact question); cf. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Mag-
netic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining 
that operability still exists even if the invention does not work perfectly under 
all conditions).  
 272. For instance, working examples helped convince the Patent Office and 
the courts that it is possible to successfully treat cancer. Compare In re Citron, 
325 F.2d 248, 249–53 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (explaining that applicants' invention 
relating to an alleged effective treatment for cancer, which lacked specific 
tests, experiments, or clinical data, asserted incredible utility in the light of 
the knowledge of the art), with In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (noting that treating cancer with chemical compounds “does not suggest 
an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve implausible scientific prin-
ciples” because there are “numerous successful chemotherapeutic agents”), 
and In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326–28 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (concluding that clin-
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examples are the best way to ensure that the public gets a 
“[more] readable and substantively useful patent document.”273 
For these reasons, some have argued that there should be an 
across-the-board working-example requirement in patent 
law,274 except for inventions in which enablement “is so appar-
ent as to virtually jump off the page and slap [a PHOSITA] in 
the face.”275
b. Solving the Manson Problem  
 
Recall that the essential utility question for the post-World 
War II patent system is how to assess utility for chemical and 
pharmaceutical inventions, particularly those that have no 
therapeutic or non-research-based use at the time patent pro-
tection is sought.276 In Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court 
imposed a heightened utility threshold (the modern utility re-
quirement) to render such compounds unpatentable.277 At least 
from a disclosure standpoint, society loses under this regime 
because it fosters secrecy, delays disclosure, and conceals valu-
able technical information.278
The result would be very different under the proposed ena-
blement-based paradigm. Consider the following hypothetical 
example loosely based on the underlying facts in In re Joly
 
279—
a sequel to Manson.280
 
ical tests, combined with the close structural similarity of the claimed com-
pounds with chemotherapeutics known in the art, would allow a PHOSITA to 
accept the claimed utility). 
 Suppose that in 2008 an inventor at a 
drug company sought to patent a class of chemical intermedi-
 273. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 642. 
 274. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 48, at 156–58; Seymore, 
Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 641–54. Professor Cotropia also advo-
cates an actual reduction to practice requirement. See Christopher A. 
Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 120–
22 (2009) (proposing a framework wherein the Patent Office would defer ex-
amination until the applicant submits evidence of actual implementation of 
the invention). 
 275. Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 48, at 156 n.151 (citing 
Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456–57 (2006) (per curiam)). Invoking 
a working example requirement probably falls within the Patent Office’s stat-
utory authority. See Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra note 23, at 1506 n.82 
(discussing the working model requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2006)); 
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 642 n.103 (same). 
 276. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 277. See 383 U.S. 519, 528–36 (1966), discussed supra Part I.C.2. 
 278. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 279. 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 280. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
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ates which can be used as building blocks for steroids that are 
similar in chemical structure to known drugs. The patent ap-
plication includes a generic claim that, by claiming a core 
chemical structure with an array of five variables appended to 
it, encompasses thousands of compounds.281 As is typical in 
pharmaceutical cases, the claim is incredibly broad282—here be-
cause it is possible to substitute each of the five variables ap-
pended to the core structure with a variety of organic function-
al groups.283
After construing the claims, assessing the PHOSITA’s level 
of skill, and evaluating the teaching provided in the patent ap-
plication,
 The patent application, however, only sets forth 
five compounds actually made (working examples). These five 
compounds are closely related to each other because the same 
variable (one of the five) is substituted in each.  
284
[R]eplacing a functional group on a chemical compound can often 
have highly unpredictable results . . . . [E]ven a change as seemingly 
trivial as replacing an isopropyl group with the isosteric cyclopropyl 
group . . . could result in either a significant improvement or reduc-
tion in the activity of the compound against a particular biological 
target.
 the examiner determines that the disclosure only 
teaches a PHOSITA how to make a narrower subgenus of fifty 
compounds, not thousands. As support for a prima facie case of 
nonenablement for the broad genus, the examiner recognizes 
that: 
285
 
 281. This style of claiming a class of chemical compounds in terms of struc-
tural formulas, where the substituents are recited in the claim language, is 
ubiquitous in the chemical and pharmaceutical arts. See In re Harnisch, 631 
F.2d 716, 719–20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (sanctioning the practice); In re Driscoll, 562 
F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (same). 
 
 282. Applicants have an incentive “to obtain very broad claims for which a 
colorable argument can be made for patentability.” ANTHONY L. MIELE, PA-
TENT STRATEGY 98 (2001); see also BRADLEY C. WRIGHT, DRAFTING PATENTS 
FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 457 (2008) (advising drafters of chemical pa-
tent applications to provide adequate support for claims that often cover bil-
lions of species). 
 283. A functional group is a group of atoms within a molecule with specific 
chemical properties that represents a potential reaction site in a compound, 
and thus determines a molecule’s chemical reactivity. See generally RICHARD 
C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC TRANSFORMATIONS: A GUIDE TO FUNC-
TIONAL GROUP PREPARATIONS (2d ed. 1999). 
 284. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text (discussing the factual 
inquiries underlying the enablement analysis). 
 285. Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omit-
ted). 
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The point here is that a PHOSITA cannot extrapolate a result 
from a few, closely-related embodiments,286 across a broad ge-
nus in an unpredictable field like chemistry, with a reasonable 
expectation of success.287
Consequently, the examiner rejects the broad generic claim 
as prima facie nonenabled because a PHOSITA would have to 
engage in undue experimentation to practice its full scope.
  
288 At 
this point the burden shifts to the applicant to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the PHOSITA’s knowledge, 
in combination with the teaching provided in the patent appli-
cation, can actually enable the full scope of the generic claim.289 
In response, the applicant argues that a well-trained organic 
chemist would know where to look in the scientific literature to 
fill in the technical gaps.290 The examiner determines that the 
proffered evidence is insufficient to rebut the prima facie case 
because it is not a “persuasive argument[], supported by suita-
ble [evidence] where necessary, that [a PHOSITA] would be 
able to make and use the claimed invention using the applica-
tion as a guide.”291
At this point, the applicant is unable or unwilling to pro-
duce the requisite evidence. Accordingly, the applicant volun-
tarily cancels the broad generic claim and pursues the narrow-
er subgenus claim covering fifty compounds. The examiner 
allows that claim and the applicant ultimately gets a much 
narrower patent—covering fifty compounds instead of thou-
sands—than that which would have issued under the current 
regime.
  
292
 
 286. An “embodiment” is a concrete form of an invention described in a pa-
tent application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD 
DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 27 (6th ed. 2013). 
  
 287. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 288. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 253, at 848 (explaining why such a 
rejection is proper). There is a danger that embodiments not described either 
cannot be made or may require experimentation which is unduly extensive. 
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 289. See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 290. Applicants often point to the much-cited statement that “a patent 
need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” 
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); see also supra note 263. However, that statement “is merely a rule of 
supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure.” Genentech, 
Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
 291. MPEP, supra note 128, § 2164.05 (citation omitted); see also In re 
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  
 292. Since (1) the current patent laws do not require any actual experimen-
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This result is a win-win for the patent system and society. 
Granting the narrower patent fulfills the quid pro quo because 
the claim scope obtained is commensurate with the disclosure 
provided.293 This limited scope should allay concerns, à la Man-
son, about the patentee creating a “monopoly of knowledge” 
that could “block off whole areas of scientific development, 
without compensating benefit to the public.”294 To the contrary, 
the public would benefit under the proposed regime because in 
exchange for the patent it would get very useful knowledge—
actual experimental details—as opposed to less helpful forms of 
disclosure.295
c. How About Enablement’s “How to Use” Requirement?  
 
Enablement requires that the applicant provide a disclo-
sure that teaches a PHOSITA both how to make and how to use 
the invention.296 The “use” requirement of § 112, however, dif-
fers from the utility requirement of § 101. Whereas the latter is 
often a subjective value judgment,297 it has been clear from the 
early days of the patent system that the purpose of the § 112 
use requirement is simply to provide the PHOSITA with a 
meaningful disclosure.298 To make this point in In re Nelson,299
[I]t is necessary . . . that the invention shall so be described in the 
specification, that [a PHOSITA] may not only understand the inven-
tion, but be able, by following the directions given in the specification, 
with the assistance of the drawings, to construct the machine or per-
form the process which is the subject of the patent.
 
Judge Rich quoted an eighteenth-century patent treatise ex-
plaining the enablement requirement: 
300
 
tation in order to obtain a patent, and (2) the Patent Office does not have its 
own testing facilities, applicants in the unpredictable arts are often very suc-
cessful in obtaining broad claims with dubious enablement. See Seymore, 
Heightened Enablement, supra note 
 
48, at 143–54; Seymore, Teaching Func-
tion, supra note 181, at 628–32. 
 293. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 294. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (discussed supra Part 
I.C.2).  
 295. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 181, at 634–35. 
 296. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (Supp. V 2011). 
 297. See Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra note 23, at 1514. 
 298. See, e.g., John W. Klooster, Historical Developments of Contemporary 
Scope, Impact of Section 112 upon Patent Practice, 6 APLA Q.J. 171, 172 
(1978). 
 299. 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 
(C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 300. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 233–34 
(1837), quoted in Nelson, 280 F.2d at 181. 
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Thus, § 112 is satisfied if the inventor describes how to use the 
invention as broadly as it is claimed. The proposed working ex-
ample requirement would do just that. 
But this does not mean that the how-to-use requirement of 
§ 112(a) should be used as a proxy for the § 101 utility require-
ment. It is true that under the current regime, an invention 
which lacks utility under § 101 fails to satisfy the how-to-use 
prong of the enablement requirement of § 112(a) as a matter of 
law.301 This makes sense when the § 101 problem is inoperabil-
ity, because if the invention cannot operate to achieve the in-
tended result, then it is impossible to enable a PHOSITA to use 
it.302 On the other hand, it is possible to enable an invention yet 
fall short of the current utility threshold. The best example is 
the factual scenario presented in Brenner v. Manson.303 To be 
sure, Manson provided an enabling disclosure, which taught a 
PHOSITA how to both make the compound and how to use it to 
make other compounds.304
This last point reveals the paradoxical nature of the mod-
ern utility requirement as it relates to disclosure. An applicant 
can assuredly disclose an invention which enables a PHOSITA 
to make and use the invention (like a chemical compound), but 
can nevertheless fail to meet the § 101 utility threshold because 
the subject matter is deemed to be a “mere research proposal” 
or “simply an object of research.”
  
305
 
 301. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But the con-
verse is not true: it is possible to invent something with utility yet still “fail[] 
so to describe it as to teach the [PHOSITA] how to practice it.” Mowry v. 
Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 644 (1871); see also Paul M. Janicke, Patent 
Disclosure—Some Problems and Current Developments: Part II, 52 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 757, 768 (1970) (providing examples).  
 Yet again, this shows that 
utility has little to do with the invention’s ability to provide a 
cognizable benefit to society. 
 302. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (cit-
ing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (“If a patent claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is [in-
operative], then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the enablement 
requirement.”)). 
 303. See 383 U.S. 519, 520–22 (1965).  
 304. See In re Manson, 333 F.2d 234, 238–39 (C.C.P.A. 1964), rev’d, Man-
son, 383 U.S. 519.  
 305. In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  
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3. Eliminating Operability 
a. The Basic Proposition  
The operability prong of the § 101 utility requirement at-
tempts to answer the objective, technical question of whether 
an invention can actually achieve its intended result.306 Unfor-
tunately, the question is often framed in subjective terms, such 
as whether a PHOSITA would believe the truth of the inven-
tor’s assertions.307 Indeed, history reveals that the operability 
inquiry often devolves into a biased judgment about the subject 
matter irrespective of technical substance.308 Inventions emerg-
ing from new, poorly understood, and paradigm-shifting tech-
nologies, as well as those from fields with a poor track record of 
success, are the most vulnerable. For example, patents for 
treating cancer and baldness continued to be denied under 
§ 101 for a lack of utility even after the scientific community 
recognized that these diseases could be successfully treated.309 
This outcome should be unsettling, because “the very purpose 
of the patent system is to encourage [the] attainment of previ-
ously unachievable results,”310 and because it frustrates the pa-
tent system’s broader mission to extend the frontiers of 
knowledge.311
To the extent that the justification for operability is to 
serve a gatekeeping function, it is an unnecessary requirement. 
The proposition is that a robust enablement analysis can effec-
tively ferret out unworkable inventions by itself, with no need 
for, or help from, its § 101 statutory cousin. Clearly an inventor 
with an inoperable invention cannot furnish an enabling disclo-
sure.
 
312
 
 306. See supra note 
 Enablement can perform the important gatekeeping 
role through an objective, technical analysis rather than 
through subjective credibility assessments that lie at the heart 
of the operability paradigm.  
41 and cases cited therein. Whether an invention is op-
erable is a question of fact. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 307. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 308. Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra note 23, at 1511–23.  
 309. See id. at 1514–22. 
 310. In re Ferens, 417 F.2d 1072, 1074 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 311. See Rich, supra note 244, at 400. 
 312. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
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b. Mechanics  
To see how the proposed enablement-based approach 
would work, consider the following hypothetical—based on an 
actual patent case.313 Suppose that an inventor files a patent 
application claiming a method of using heat to transform anti-
mony into gold.314 (This claim sounds like alchemy—the trans-
mutation of a cheap element into a precious one in a nonradio-
active process.)315 The application discloses a working example, 
including the amount of starting material (antimony) used, re-
action conditions and temperatures, and the amount of product 
(gold) isolated.316
An examiner with expertise in the field reads the applica-
tion and checks it for compliance with the statutory patentabil-
ity requirements.
 
317 Focusing on enablement, the patent appli-
cation is presumptively enabled as filed.318 To establish a prima 
facie case of nonenablement,319
 
 313. On May 7, 1897, Edward C. Brice filed a patent application claiming a 
process for making gold from other elements. See H. Carrington Bolton, Recent 
Progress of Alchemy in America, 76 CHEMICAL NEWS 61, 62–63 (1897) (describ-
ing the claimed method); Adolf G. Vogeler, A Nineteenth Century Gold Factory, 
60 PHARMACEUTICAL J. 189, 189–91 (1898) (presenting additional experi-
mental details). 
 the examiner bears the initial 
 314. Antimony is a chemical element typically obtained from complex min-
eral ores containing lead, tin, zinc, silver, and gold. I.J. Polmear, Metallurgy of 
the Elements, in CHEMISTRY OF ARSENIC, ANTIMONY AND BISMUTH 43 (N.C. 
Norman ed., 1998). In the actual case, the inventor chose antimony because it 
is found in gold ores. Chicago Alchemist Thinks by Following in Nature’s 
Pathway to Make Gold of Dross, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1897, at 33. 
 315. See 1 J.W. MELLOR, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON INORGANIC AND 
THEORETICAL CHEMISTRY 44–55 (1922) (exploring the history of alchemy). 
Brice thought that heat could accomplish the task because some researchers 
believed “that at some long ago period . . . tremendous convulsions of subter-
ranean gases threw up from the bowls [sic] of the earth some metallic sub-
stance which underwent a transformation into gold.” Chicago Alchemist 
Thinks by Following in Nature’s Pathway to Make Gold of Dross, supra note 
314. 
 316. Brice built a gold-making factory in Chicago that processed over 
10,000 pounds of crude ore per day. See Vogeler, supra note 313, at 189–90 
(describing the daily operation of the National Metallurgical Company). 
 317. Recall that under the current patent statute an invention must be 
useful (§ 101), novel (§ 102), nonobvious (§ 103), and directed to patentable 
subject matter (§ 101). 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). In addi-
tion, § 112(a) requires that the application adequately disclose the invention, 
and § 112(b) requires that the application conclude with claims which deline-
ate the invention with particularity. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b) (Supp. V 2011). 
 318. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
 319. An examiner must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (articulating 
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burden of setting forth a reasonable explanation as to why the 
enablement provided by the applicant is not commensurate 
with the claim scope sought.320 The examiner must explain any 
doubts as to the accuracy of any statement with evidence or 
reasoning rooted in fact.321
The examiner undertakes a Wands analysis by construing 
the claim (factor seven),
 
322 determining the PHOSITA’s 
knowledge and level of skill (factor five),323 and evaluating the 
teaching provided in the written description (factors one and 
two)324 in light of the nature of the technology (factors three and 
four).325 Almost immediately, the examiner recognizes that in-
formation pertaining to the source and purity of the antimony 
is conspicuously absent from the disclosure. Researchers in the 
field include this information as a matter of course, because 
impurities in starting materials can lead to irreproducible or 
spurious results.326 To bolster this reasoning, the examiner con-
sults the “antimony” entry in a chemical encyclopedia. It re-
veals that “[m]ost of the antimony produced in the United 
States is from complex antimony deposits found in Idaho, Ne-
vada, Alaska, and Montana . . . . These deposits consist of 
[minerals containing] silver or gold.”327
 
the burden-shifting framework used in patent examination). 
 Based on the totality of 
 320. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 321. Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224; see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402, 
1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (holding that the Patent Office must provide a factual 
basis for a lack of enablement rejection, rather than conclusory statements re-
garding the PHOSITA’s level of skill). 
 322. See MPEP, supra note 128, § 2164.04 (instructing an examiner who 
suspects that one or more claims lack enablement to first construe them to de-
termine their scope); see also AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 
1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because a patent specification must enable the full 
scope of the claimed invention, the enablement inquiry typically begins with a 
construction of the claims.” (citations omitted)). 
 323. See supra note 266. 
 324. See supra note 264. 
 325. See supra note 265. 
 326. See MAXINE LINTERN, LABORATORY SKILLS FOR SCIENCE AND MEDI-
CINE 64–65 (2007) (explaining that the methods section should contain infor-
mation including the commercial supplier from which materials were pur-
chased so that a competent researcher can read the recipe and repeat exactly 
what was done). Laboratory chemicals vary widely in degrees of purity. See, 
e.g., CHEMICAL TECHNICIANS’ READY REFERENCE HANDBOOK 549 (Gershon J. 
Shugar & Jack T. Ballinger eds., 3d ed. 1990) (listing grades of purity). 
 327. 3 KIRK-OTHMER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY 42 (Arza 
Seidel ed., 5th ed. 2004) (emphasis added); see also supra note 314. 
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the evidence,328 the examiner rejects the claim as prima facie 
nonenabled under § 112(a) because a PHOSITA faced with the 
inadequate guidance vis-à-vis the source and purity of the an-
timony would have to engage in undue experimentation to 
achieve the intended result.329
Next, the examiner sends the rejection to the applicant ac-
companied with a request for information regarding the source 
and purity of the antimony.
 
330 The applicant responds by dis-
closing that the antimony is technical grade (lowest purity) ob-
tained from Acme Metals Company in Yellow Pine, Idaho.331 
Further research reveals that Yellow Pine has one of the larg-
est gold-antimony deposits in the nation332 and that Acme’s 
technical grade antimony contains ten percent gold by weight. 
The examiner performs a calculation revealing that the amount 
of gold reported in the applicant’s working example is less than 
the amount of gold known to be present in the antimony start-
ing material. These facts lead the examiner to conclude that 
the applicant did not transform antimony into gold but merely 
recovered a fraction of the gold already present in the starting 
material.333 When presented with this information, the appli-
cant decides to abandon the application.334
 
 328. See MPEP, supra note 
 
128, § 2164.01(a) (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (reminding examiners that “any conclusion of 
nonenablement must be based on the evidence as a whole”). 
 329. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 330. During the course of patent examination, the examiner may request 
“[t]echnical information known to [the] applicant concerning . . . the disclo-
sure, the claimed subject matter, other factual information pertinent to pa-
tentability, or concerning the accuracy of the examiner’s stated interpretation 
of such items.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.105(a)(1)(viii) (2013). 
 331. Technical grade, the lowest chemical grade, “is used industrially, but 
is generally unsuitable for laboratory [use] because of the presence of many 
impurities.” CHEMICAL TECHNICIANS’ READY REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra 
note 326, at 549. 
 332. See, e.g., Junius Larsen & William C. Peters, Idaho, 45 INDUS. & 
ENG’G CHEMISTRY 2424, 2424–31 (1953) (describing the deposits). 
 333. The story in the actual case is quite interesting. After receiving two 
inoperability rejections, Brice asked the Patent Office for permission to 
demonstrate the claimed process. See Bolton, supra note 313, at 62. Since the 
Patent Office lacked laboratory facilities, the Secretary of the Treasury al-
lowed Brice to use the spacious facilities at the U.S. Mint. Id. The Director of 
the Mint bought the requisite materials from reputable dealers and directed 
three experts to carry out the claimed process. Id. After conducting replicate 
experiments, the experts reported that the claimed process failed to recover 
the entire amount of gold known to be present in the starting material, lead-
ing them to conclude that there was “not the slightest evidence of any ‘crea-
tion’ or transmutation.” Id. at 62–64 (reproducing the Report from Andrew 
Mason et al., U.S. Assay Office, to the Hon. R.E. Preston, Director of the Mint 
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The foregoing hypothetical illustrates two important 
points. First, it shows that a robust Wands analysis can ferret 
out a truly unworkable invention. Though alchemistic claims 
often conjure up notions of fraud,335 the examiner did not need 
to venture down the credibility path because requesting more 
detail about the working example revealed the applicant’s er-
ror. Second, it shows that many inoperability problems can be 
traced to faulty experimental technique.336
c. Plausibility  
 In patent law, as in 
other contexts, a careful examination of the disclosure can 
readily reveal whether an intended result stems from sloppy 
research. 
There is some decisional law that supports the proposition 
that if the case for nonenablement is very strong, that is a suf-
ficient basis to deny patentability, notwithstanding deficiencies 
under § 101. In one case, In re Speas, the applicant sought to 
claim  
any and all devices and systems which operate in such a manner as to 
violate the [S]econd [L]aw of [T]hermodynamics as it is currently un-
derstood and accepted as inviolable by a majority of the worldwide 
scientific community, and any and all devices and systems which are 
adapted for converting thermal energy into other energy forms by 
contacting a heat source without the necessity of also contacting a 
thermal medium of lower temperature.337
Two things stand out. First, the “any and all” claim lan-
guage immediately raises enablement concerns due to its po-
 
 
(May 22, 1897)). As to the final disposition, Brice argued that the Patent Office 
rejected his application out of fear of a “monetary panic.” Vogeler, supra note 
313, at 189. 
 334. Of course, the applicant could try to salvage something and seek a pa-
tent claiming a method of separating gold from antimony. However, that claim 
would be subject to novelty, nonobviousness, and other patentability hurdles. 
See supra note 317. 
 335. See WILLIAM R. NEWMAN & LAWRENCE M. PRINCIPE, ALCHEMY TRIED 
IN THE FIRE 12 (2005) (discussing the divergence of chemistry and alchemy by 
the eighteenth century, when alchemy was repudiated as “simply fraudulent”); 
see also HERBERT S. REDGROVE, BYGONE BELIEFS 123–24 (1920) (contrasting 
“genuine” alchemists of ancient times with those who entered the quest in 
modern times). 
 336. Experimental researchers must work under “carefully contrived cir-
cumstances where all other potential disturbing factors are eliminated” so that 
“the explanation for an observed ‘effect’ [is] something more interesting than, 
say, an impure chemical reagent.” JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE 94 (2000). 
 337. 273 F. App’x 945, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting from Speas’s patent application). 
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tentially limitless breadth.338 Second, any device that could con-
tinuously convert heat completely to work without any addi-
tional energy input would violate the Second Law of Thermo-
dynamics.339 Though not mentioned in the record or in the 
Federal Circuit opinion, the claimed device is a perpetual mo-
tion machine.340 But a closer look at the applicant’s description 
of the invention reveals that the disclosed device does not vio-
late the Second Law of Thermodynamics because it actually 
draws in thermal energy from the surroundings.341
The examiner rejected the claim independently under 
§ 112 ¶ 1 and § 101, respectively, after determining that: (1) the 
enablement provided was not commensurate with the claim 
scope sought; and (2) the invention could not achieve the in-
tended result.
 
342 The Board explicitly affirmed each rejection.343 
Although the Patent Office argued both issues in its appellate 
brief to the Federal Circuit, it contended that the court could 
resolve the case solely on enablement grounds with no need to 
reach the § 101 issue.344
 
 338. See, e.g., In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that the applicant failed to enable a claim covering “any and all live, non-
pathogenic vaccines, and processes for making such vaccines”). 
 This argument makes sense, because if 
 339. The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that it is impossible to 
convert heat completely to work without some energy loss. R.K. RAJPUT, EN-
GINEERING THERMODYNAMICS 232–33 (3d ed. 2010).  
 340. A perpetual motion machine can run forever without any input of ex-
ternal power, meaning that it can do work without consuming energy. The oft-
cited technical objection is that perpetual motion violates the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, which holds that a machine cannot be 100 percent efficient 
because it can only use a fraction of the energy it receives for work and must 
lose a significant portion to the environment as heat, usually through friction. 
See Dimitris Tsaousis, Perpetual Motion Machine, 1 J. ENG’G SCI. & TECH. 
REV. 53, 53–57 (2008); supra note 339. When recognized, perpetual motion 
machines raise red flags at the Patent Office and in the courts. See MPEP, su-
pra note 128, § 608.03 (permitting an examiner to request a working model 
when the applicant claims a perpetual motion machine). 
 341. See Speas, 273 F. App’x at 946 (“Thus, the movement of the ferrofluid 
imparts mechanical energy upon the wheel. Speas claims that because this 
ferrofluid is moved and adds energy to the paddle wheel ‘without input into 
the system other than ambient thermal energy,’ it is proof that the second law 
of thermodynamics is not inviolate—an object of the invention.”). 
 342. Id.; see also Brief for Appellee Director of the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office at 7–8, In re Speas, 273 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 
2008-1076) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. 
 343. Brief for Appellee, supra note 342, at 9–10. 
 344. Id. at 18. For support for this reasoning, see Raytheon Co. v. Roper 
Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[W]hen a claim requires a means 
for accomplishing an unattainable result, the claimed invention must be con-
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the device did not violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 
the applicant’s disclosure would not be enabling. 
The Federal Circuit adopted this reasoning and affirmed 
on nonenablement grounds. The court held that the Board’s re-
jection was supported by substantial evidence345 because the 
applicant’s “particularly broad” and “limitless” claim was not 
enabled by a description which was commensurately broad in 
its teaching.346 The important point is that it was possible to 
screen out this invention solely based on (a lack of) technical 
merit, thereby avoiding any need to engage in a § 101 analy-
sis.347
Both Speas and the alchemy hypothetical show that 
whether an invention can achieve the intended result is a yes-
or-no question. If the answer is no, then enablement alone can 
resolve the issue, because there is no way that the applicant 
can provide an enabling description for something that does not 
work.
 
348 In other words, a careful examination of the proffered 
working example(s) will reveal the fatal flaw.349 This enable-
ment-based approach avoids the pitfalls of the current utility 
paradigm, streamlines patent examination,350
 
sidered inoperative as claimed and the claim must be held invalid under either 
§ 101 or § 112 of 35 U.S.C.” (emphasis added)).  
 and prevents the 
 345. For appeals from the Patent Office, the Federal Circuit reviews legal 
conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. In re 
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Thus, the Board’s findings of 
fact underlying the enablement determination are reviewed for substantial 
evidence, while the legal conclusion of enablement is reviewed de novo. In re 
Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
 346. Speas, 273 F. App’x at 946.  
 347. In his commentary on Speas, Professor Crouch reached a similar con-
clusion: “Although this type of case is fun to read, it also provides an interest-
ing lesson—that [there are] tools to reject inadequate patent applications on 
their merits without resorting to broad exclusions of particular subject mat-
ter.” Dennis Crouch, CAFC Rejects Patent on Invention to Overcome the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics, PATENTLY-O (May 1, 2008), http://www.patentlyo 
.com/patent/2008/05/cafc-rejects-pa.html. 
 348. Cf. Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 956 (“[B]ecause the impossible cannot be 
enabled, a claim containing a limitation impossible to meet may be held inva-
lid under § 112.”). 
 349. Cf. ROBERT L. PARK, VOODOO SCIENCE 9 (2002) (“Error is a normal 
part of science, and uncovering flaws in scientific observations or reasoning is 
the everyday work of scientists.”); JOHN WALLER, FABULOUS SCIENCE 40 
(2004) (noting that an experimental result can be “so aberrant that error 
seems the most reasonable explanation”). 
 350. This is because the examiner would no longer need to expend the time 
and effort formulating and building a record to support multiple rejections for 
a single issue. See discussion supra Part III.C.3 (explaining how when opera-
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public from granting a patent in exchange for a useless disclo-
sure. 
D. THE ROLE OF NONOBVIOUSNESS 
A robust enablement analysis would ensure that the public 
gets a useful disclosure in exchange for the patent grant. Since 
the breadth of the disclosure would tightly limit the scope of 
the patent, concerns about creating unjustifiable roadblocks for 
future innovators would diminish. But even if enablement is 
satisfied, a fact-intensive evaluation of the invention’s technical 
merit might suggest that a patent should not issue at all, be-
cause the potential benefit that society might derive from the 
invention and its disclosure do not justify the costs of granting 
a patent.351
1. Understanding Nonobviousness 
 This is because the claimed invention does not dif-
fer substantially from what is already known. In such a situa-
tion, the proper tool to screen patentability is nonobviousness, 
not utility. 
The statutory requirement for nonobviousness, embodied 
in § 103 of the Patent Act,352 helps fulfill the patent system’s 
broad policy goals of promoting technological progress,353 coor-
dinating the future development of technology,354 and spurring 
innovation.355 By reserving the quid pro quo of patent rights for 
inventions that represent a significant step forward in the field, 
the nonobviousness requirement ensures that patents are only 
awarded for those inventions (though new and enabling)356
 
bility and enablement are both at issue, the issue can be reduced solely to en-
ablement). 
 
 351. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 241, at 1594; cf. Gregory Mandel, 
The Non-Obvious Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard 
Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 62 (2008) (“The 
nonobviousness requirement protects society against the social costs both of 
denying a deserving patent and of granting an undeserving monopoly.”). 
 352. The statute provides in relevant part: 
  A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwith-
standing that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set 
forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention 
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole 
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention to a [PHOSITA] to which the claimed invention pertains. 
35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 2011). 
 353. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 354. See Kitch, supra note 118, at 266. 
 355. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 
 356. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 68, § 3.01 (noting that nonobviousness asks 
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whose disclosures will actually add to the storehouse of useful 
knowledge.357 Among other things, this induces inventors to ex-
plore more challenging, socially preferred projects rather than 
pursue trivial extensions of what is already known.358 As Pro-
fessor Mark Lemley puts it, nonobviousness “sets a minimum 
threshold social value the invention must contribute in order to 
make it worth the trouble of issuing and enforcing a patent.”359
Like enablement, nonobviousness is a standard. It requires 
a comparison of the invention that the applicant seeks to pa-
tent with the “prior art,” which refers to preexisting knowledge 
and technology already available to the public.
 
360 In Graham v. 
John Deere Co., the Supreme Court articulated the basic 
framework for determining nonobviousness.361
 
if an invention is “new enough” to warrant a patent); Joseph Scott Miller, 
Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 1, 2 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) 
(“[N]onobviousness divides the patentably new from the unpatentably new.”). 
 It is a question 
of law based on the following pertinent underlying facts: (1) the 
scope and content of the relevant prior art, (2) the differences 
between the prior art and the claimed invention, (3) the 
PHOSITA’s level of skill, and (4) secondary considerations that 
 357. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innovation, ad-
vancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent 
requisites in a patent system . . . .”); Atl. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 
(1883) (“The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some sub-
stantial discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge . . . . It was never 
the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling device . . . .”); 
Kitch, supra note 118, at 283 (arguing that patents should not be granted for 
the use and development of known technical information because “proper in-
centives for its acquisition and use exist without a property right”). 
 358. Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 137 (2000); see also Michael J. Meurer & Katherine 
J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 549 (2008) (“The nonobviousness threshold may 
be used as a ‘stick’ to induce researchers to pursue more difficult, socially pre-
ferred research projects.”). 
 359. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Prop-
erty Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1001 (1997); cf. Craig Allen Nard, Deference, 
Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1437 n.81 (1995) (“The 
nonobviousness requirement assures that the inventor contributes something 
to society before she is granted a . . . right to exclude others from making, sell-
ing, or using her invention.”).  
 360. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 2011) (defining the documents and activ-
ities that can serve as prior art); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 6). 
 361. See 383 U.S. at 17. 
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provide objective proof of nonobviousness, like the fact that the 
invention fulfilled a long-felt but unsolved need.362
Thus, inventions that are sufficiently close to the prior art 
and within the PHOSITA’s technical grasp at the time the 
claimed invention is made are unpatentable.
  
363 This essentially 
“creates a ‘patent-free’ zone around the state of the art,”364 al-
lowing the PHOSITA to substitute materials, streamline pro-
cesses, and “[make] the usual marginal improvements which 
occur as a technology matures.”365
2. Nonobviousness: The Proper Gatekeeper 
 
The idea that nonobviousness is a more appropriate tool for 
evaluating technical merit than utility finds support in one of 
the Federal Circuit’s most powerful dissenting opinions, In re 
Fisher.366 The issue before the court was the utility of short 
DNA sequences known as expressed sequence tags (ESTs).367 
Though the applicant asserted seven uses for the claimed 
ESTs, the examiner made a § 101 rejection because: (1) the dis-
closed uses were applicable to all ESTs and not specific to the 
those claimed, and (2) there was no known use for the proteins 
produced from the claimed ESTs.368 Citing Brenner v. Manson, 
the majority affirmed the rejection because the claimed ESTs 
were merely research tools that lacked specific and substantial 
utility.369
 
 362. Id. at 17–18. Subsequent case law has established that a conclusion of 
obviousness must be supported by clearly articulated reasoning. KSR Int’l Co. 
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (explaining that in addition to the 
Graham factors, “[r]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by 
mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reason-
ing with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obvi-
ousness” (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006))); see also 
MPEP, supra note 
 In dissent, Judge Rader argued that ESTs—like mi-
croscopes, screening assays, and nucleotide sequencing tech-
niques—are research tools that provide a “cognizable benefit to 
128, § 2141(III) (listing rationales that examiners can use 
to support a conclusion of obviousness). 
 363. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 2011); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF 
PATENTS 305 (2d ed. 2010). 
 364. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 
288 (3d ed. 2009); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 
262 (1978) (“[T]he stringent requirements for patent protection . . . assure that 
ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”). 
 365. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 364, at 288. 
 366. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 367. Id. at 1367, 1369. 
 368. Id. at 1367–68. 
 369. Id. at 1369–76. 
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society.”370
  In truth, I have some sympathy with the Patent Office’s dilemma. 
[It] needs some tool to reject inventions that may advance the “useful 
arts” but not sufficiently to warrant the valuable exclusive right of a 
patent. The Patent Office has seized upon this utility requirement to 
reject these research tools as contributing “insubstantially” to the ad-
vance of the useful arts. The utility requirement is ill suited to that 
task, however, because it lacks any standard for assessing the state of 
the prior art and the contributions of the claimed advance. The proper 
tool for assessing sufficient contribution to the useful arts is the 
[non]obviousness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103. . . . [R]ather than 
distort the utility test, the Patent Office should seek ways to apply 
the correct test, the test used world wide for such assessments (other 
than in the United States), namely inventive step or obviousness.
 But what is most important for present purposes is 
that he argued that the utility rejection was improper: 
371
As Professor Mark Janis recently noted, “Judge Rader’s Fisher 
dissent is a powerful reminder of our longstanding commitment 
to obviousness as the ultimate condition of patentability.”
 
372
To illustrate how nonobviousness would screen inventions 
in the new paradigm, consider again the hypothetical discussed 
above involving a new class of chemical intermediates.
  
373 Sup-
pose the applicant has responded to the aforementioned 
nonenablement rejection by narrowing the scope of the claims 
to a subgenus of fifty compounds instead of the genus of thou-
sands originally sought.374 When the examiner compares the 
subgenus to the prior art,375 the search reveals that the claimed 
compounds are novel but very similar to those disclosed in a 
1998 book entitled Chemical Intermediates for Pharmaceuti-
cals. In fact, the claimed compounds and those described in the 
book are all members of the same chemical family (“homo-
logs”),376
 
 370. Id. at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 the only difference being that a “methyl” group (one 
 371. Id. at 1381–82. 
 372. Mark D. Janis, Tuning the Obviousness Inquiry After KSR, 7 WASH. 
J.L. TECH. & ARTS 335, 340 (2012) (emphasis added); cf. NONOBVIOUSNESS—
THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) 
(compiling papers celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of codification of 
the nonobviousness doctrine as § 103); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success 
and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 
803, 812 (1988) (describing nonobviousness as the “final gatekeeper of the pa-
tent system”); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. 
REV. 771, 789 (2003) (describing nonobviousness as “[t]he fundamental gate-
keeper to patenting”). 
 373. See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
 374. See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
 375. See supra text accompanying note 360. 
 376. “Homologs” refer to a family of chemical compounds that vary from 
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carbon) on the core structure of the prior art compounds has 
been replaced with an “ethyl” group (two carbons) on the core 
structure of the claimed compounds.377 Predictably, given the 
minimal variation in structure, the claimed compounds are 
prepared by the same methods, have similar physical proper-
ties, and undergo the very same chemical reactions (albeit 
slightly faster) as the prior art compounds.378
After making the factual findings set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Graham,
 
379 the examiner concludes that it would have 
been obvious for a PHOSITA at the time of the invention to 
make the claimed compounds. The examiner supports this con-
clusion with two rationales. First, the claimed compounds are a 
“straightforward one-carbon extension”380 of a carbon chain—a 
standard structural modification in organic chemistry.381 They 
represent “[a] simple substitution of one known [chemical func-
tionality] for another to obtain predictable results.”382 Accord-
ingly, a PHOSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of 
success in independently arriving at the claimed invention.383
 
member to member by a methylene (—CH2—) group. In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 
457, 458 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1977); cf. In re Coes, 173 F.2d 1012, 1013–14 (C.C.P.A. 
1949) (“A homologous series may therefore be defined as a family of chemically 
related compounds, the composition of which varies from member to member 
by one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen.” (quoting JULIUS B. COHEN, 
THEORETICAL ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 51 (3d ed. 1934))). 
 
Second and relatedly, Chemical Intermediates for Pharmaceuti-
cals and knowledge in the art “would have suggested making 
 377. A methyl group (Me or CH3—) is the simplest carbon-containing func-
tional group in organic chemistry. THOMAS N. SORRELL, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 
20 (2d ed. 2006). An ethyl group (Et or CH3—CH2—) is the next simplest. Id. 
 378. See COHEN, supra note 376, at 50 (noting that homologs undergo simi-
lar chemical reactions); id. at 51 (“The advantage of [homology] will now be 
obvious, for it will only be necessary to describe the chemical characteristics of 
one member, when that of the whole series of homologues may be inferred.”). 
 379. See supra text accompanying note 362. 
 380. K. PETER C. VOLLHARDT & NEIL E. SCHORE, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY: 
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 300 (4th ed. 2003) (describing a “homologation”). 
 381. See id. 
 382. MPEP, supra note 128, § 2143(B); cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 
U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in 
the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for anoth-
er known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable 
result.”).  
 383. See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 
1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reaffirming “reasonable expectation of success” 
jurisprudence post-KSR); In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (“Obviousness does not require absolute predictability . . . . [A]ll that is 
required is a reasonable expectation of success.”). 
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the specific molecular modifications necessary to achieve the 
claimed invention”384 because in this area of chemistry, ethyl 
derivatives are known and expected to react slightly faster 
than the methyl derivatives.385 Thus, this is a situation where a 
prior art compound “suggest[s] its homolog . . . because such 
compounds often have similar properties[,] and therefore chem-
ists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making 
them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties.”386
Having made a prima facie case of obviousness, “the bur-
den of going forward shifts to the applicant.”
  
387 The applicant 
attempts to rebut the prima facie case by arguing that the 
claimed compounds show an unexpected property over the prior 
art;388 namely, that they react faster than a PHOSITA would 
expect.389
  The evidence as a whole
 In response, the examiner explains why the record 
supports the opposite conclusion:  
390
 gives rise to a presumption that homo-
logs that are structurally very close (“adjacent homologs”)
391
 
 384. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)); see also Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 
1007 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[T]o establish a prima facie case of obviousness in cases 
involving new chemical compounds, the accused infringer must identify some 
reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound in a par-
ticular manner.”). 
 will have 
 385. See, e.g., SORRELL, supra note 377, at 148–49 (illustrating how the 
variation in reactivity of homologous compounds can be attributed to “induc-
tive effects”—the differing ability of methyl and ethyl groups to release elec-
trons); Paul von Ragué Schleyer & Curtis W. Woodworth, Substituents and 
Bridgehead Carbonium Ion Reactivities. Inductive and Steric Effects of Alkyl 
Groups in Saturated Systems, 90 J. AM. CHEMICAL SOC’Y 6528, 6528–30 (1968) 
(exploring the increased rate of reactivity across a homologous series). 
 386. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 995–96 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1356–57). 
 387. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (interpreting 
Graham to require the Patent Office to provide a factual basis for a § 103 re-
jection as a part of the prima facie case). 
 388. To prevail, the inventor must show “that the claimed invention exhib-
its some superior property or advantage that [a PHOSITA] would have found 
surprising or unexpected.” In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 389. Cf. supra text accompanying note 378 (pointing out that the claimed 
compounds would react slightly faster, although predictably so). 
 390. In considering rebuttal evidence, “[t]he ultimate determination of pa-
tentability must be based on consideration of the entire record, by a prepon-
derance of evidence, with due consideration to the persuasiveness of any ar-
guments and any secondary evidence.” MPEP, supra note 128, § 716.01(d) 
(citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 391. In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457, 458 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1977).  
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similar properties.
392
 Of course, since the prior art compounds and the 
claimed compounds are not identical, some differences in properties 
are expected to result.
393
 That the claimed compounds react two to 
three times faster than the prior art compounds, however, is expected 
because the properties of homologs show regularities of increase (or 
decrease) across a series.
394
 The totality of the evidence shows that 
the replacement of a methyl with an ethyl was within the capabilities 
of the PHOSITA, and that the slight increase in reactivity did not 
“produce a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and 
not merely in degree from the results of the prior art.”
395
Lacking any additional evidence, the applicant decides to 
abandon the application. 
 Thus, the 
presumed expectation stands unrebutted.  
That the patent is ultimately derailed in this scenario is 
good for the patent system and very much in line with the goals 
of the proposal. Even if an invention is new and supported by 
an enabling disclosure, Graham teaches that it “may still not 
be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what 
was known before is not considered sufficiently great to war-
rant a patent.”396 Making a class of homologs that are virtually 
identical to the prior art in every respect is a routine endeavor 
and a mere trivial modification to what is already known. This 
means that the inventor could not provide a useful disclosure to 
society, because information about the homologs would add 
nothing to the public storehouse of knowledge.397 At the time of 
the invention, the homologs were well within the PHOSITA’s 
skill and technical grasp and would have arisen through ordi-
nary technological progress. Indeed, organic chemists contem-
plate homologs all the time when constructing compounds with 
desired properties.398
 
 392. See id. at 460–61. 
  
 393. MPEP, supra note 128, § 716.02.  
 394. See GEORGE FOWNES, FOWNES’ MANUAL OF CHEMISTRY 395 (Robert 
Bridges ed., 1857); see also W. H. PERKIN & F. STANLEY KIPPING, ORGANIC 
CHEMISTRY 67–68 (1900).  
 395. In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1955), quoted in Iron Grip 
Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc., 392 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2004); cf. In re 
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding prima facie obvi-
ousness was not overcome where the alleged difference in properties between 
the claimed compound and the prior art compound “is a matter of degree ra-
ther than kind”).  
 396. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966). 
 397. Cf. Miller, supra note 356, at 2 (“It is socially wasteful for us to pay a 
patent-backed premium for an innovation that we are almost certain to receive 
for free and just as early.” (footnote omitted)). 
 398. See supra note 386 and accompanying text. 
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This hypothetical reveals that nonobviousness ultimately 
performs three interrelated gatekeeping roles in the proposed 
paradigm. First, it protects (the integrity of) the public store-
house of useful knowledge.399 Second, it maintains a “patent-
free zone” around the prior art which allows researchers to 
tinker.400 Third, it “weed[s] out those inventions [that] would 
not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a pa-
tent.”401
E. POLICY TRADEOFFS 
 
1. On Patent Reform 
The impetus for patent reform has been driven in large 
part by a belief that “too many patents are granted on too many 
inventions.”402 Various commentators contend that the ease 
with which patents can be obtained has led to the well-
publicized backlog in the Patent Office403 and the issuance of 
patents of questionable quality.404 One oft-cited cause of these 
problems is low substantive standards of patentability.405
 
 399. See supra note 
 This 
357 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra notes 364–65 and accompanying text. 
 401. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11. 
 402. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 480 (2011). 
 403. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, U.S. Sets 21st-Century Goal: Building a Bet-
ter Patent Office, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A1 (providing backlog statistics 
and attributing the recent surge in applications to the Internet age). One 
cause for the backlog is an increase in the number of patent application filings 
over time while the time available for examiners to review applications has 
remained constant. See John L. King, Patent Examination Procedures and Pa-
tent Quality, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 54, 63 (Wesley 
M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (presenting an empirical study). 
 404. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DIS-
CONTENTS 74 (2004) (describing what can happen when the Patent Office 
“falls down on the job”); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Of-
fice a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 181–82 (2008) (exploring criticisms). 
Quality can be defined as “the capacity of a granted patent to meet (or exceed) 
the statutory standards of patentability—most importantly, to [cover inven-
tions that are] novel, nonobvious, and clearly and sufficiently described.” R. 
Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
2135, 2138 (2009). From an economic perspective, a high-quality patent is “one 
that covers an invention that would not otherwise be made [but for the incen-
tive of a patent] or one that ensures that a good idea is commercialized.” 
Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent 
System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 
991 (2004). 
 405. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 404, at 11 (noting that weak 
novelty and nonobviousness standards have led to patents of dubious quality); 
Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
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criticism deserves attention, because adjusting these standards 
is considered the principal tool for modulating the scope, fre-
quency, and quality of patents.406 Indeed, tightening the stand-
ards of patentability has been a major goal of judicial efforts at 
patent reform.407 For instance, in a series of landmark deci-
sions, courts have trimmed the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter,408 made it harder for an applicant to satisfy the 
nonobviousness requirement,409 and reinvigorated the require-
ment that applicants provide an adequate disclosure of the in-
vention.410
The point here is that modulating the gatekeeping role of 
the statutory patentability requirements is a key element of pa-
tent reform.
  
411 This makes sense. If the standards are suffi-
ciently high, an applicant is less likely to get a patent (or per-
haps is deterred from filing an application altogether).412
 
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 689 (2004) (“The Patent Of-
fice . . . appears to grant many patents that, when carefully scrutinized, fail to 
meet basic patentability standards.”). 
 Since 
the extant utility requirement already does these things, any 
proposal to eliminate it goes against the grain of most academic 
commentary and conventional thinking about patent reform. 
But reform efforts always must be balanced against competing 
(and perhaps conflicting) objectives of the patent system. 
 406. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 270, at 109, 142.  
 407. Patentability standards evolve primarily through judicial rather than 
legislative action. See supra note 45. 
 408. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that 
claims relating to a method of hedging risks are unpatentable). 
 409. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (rejecting 
the Federal Circuit’s rigid test for nonobviousness due to its inconsistency 
with the “expansive and flexible” approach set forth in Supreme Court prece-
dent). 
 410. See, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940–41 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (reiterating that an applicant must provide a disclosure which 
enables a person having ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of 
the claimed invention without undue experimentation); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (reaffirming 
well-settled law that an applicant must provide a disclosure showing posses-
sion of the full scope of the claimed subject matter). 
 411. See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 990, 994 (2013) (“[I]t appears that raising the substantive standards of 
patentability could go a long way toward solving the [patent] quality prob-
lem.”). 
 412. “To put it crudely, if the [P]atent [O]ffice allows bad patents to issue, 
this encourages people with bad applications to show up.” JAFFE & LERNER, 
supra note 404, at 175. On the other hand, a robust regime does the opposite 
because inventors “would understand that [low-quality] applications are a 
waste of time and money.” Id. 
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2. The Need to Foster and Reward Invention 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that two fundamental 
policy objectives of the patent system are to foster and reward 
invention and to promote the disclosure of inventions to stimu-
late further innovation.413 The reward, of course, is the excluso-
ry right conferred by the patent grant.414 The goals are related: 
the reward of a patent encourages inventors to publicly disclose 
the technical details of the invention rather than keeping them 
as a trade secret.415
A starting point for fostering and rewarding invention is to 
eliminate obstacles that discourage applicants from entering 
the patent system in the first place. The modern utility re-
quirement is one such obstacle—at least for those who seek pa-
tents on chemicals, seemingly impossible inventions, paradigm-
shifting inventions, and inventions emerging from nascent 
technologies. All inventors want to believe that they will get—
and are, in fact, entitled to—a fair shot at getting a patent. But 
if potential applicants believe that the Patent Office and the 
courts are biased against granting patents for certain types of 
inventions (which is likely given the subjective nature of the 
utility requirement), they may decide not to waste their time 
and money pursuing a patent if a denial is inevitable. Put 
simply, “inventors respond to how the Patent Office behaves.”
  
416
Under the regime proposed herein, an inventor claiming 
subject matter that currently falls into a disfavored class, and 
who knows that an application will receive an objective, tech-
nical examination, might decide to seek a patent. In other 
words, the proposed regime might attract to the patent system 
inventors who currently forego patenting because of the extant 
utility requirement. Society would benefit because the disclo-
sure will add technical information to the public storehouse of 
knowledge that otherwise would likely be lost.
  
417
 
 413. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (citing 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974)). 
 
 414. For a discussion of the “long intellectual history” of the reward theory 
of patent law and arguments for and against it, see Mark F. Grady & Jay I. 
Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 310–13 
(1992). 
 415. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 
(1944); see also supra note 241 and accompanying text.  
 416. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 404, at 175. 
 417. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Utility is the most subjective standard in the entirety of 
patent law. Since the early days of the patent system, deter-
mining whether something has utility has largely involved a 
value judgment about the invention and when, or if, it should 
be patentable. Indeed, utility has been the patentability lever 
of choice for the Patent Office and the courts when there is no 
sound, objective, technical reason for denying a patent.  
It is now time to eliminate utility as a condition of patent-
ability. To the extent that usefulness matters at all, patent law 
should be less concerned with useful inventions and more con-
cerned with ensuring that the public gets a useful disclosure. 
Indeed, it is the disclosure that conveys useful technical infor-
mation about the invention and benefits the public by adding to 
the sum of useful knowledge. Importantly, the other patentabil-
ity requirements can effectively ensure that the patent grant 
will provide the public with a useful disclosure without a stand-
alone utility requirement. 
 
